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SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

Soviet Military Doctrine as Strategic Deception: An Offensive Military Strategy for Defense of the Socialist Fatherland

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Soviet military doctrine from 1962 to 1988 was a deliberate strategic deception of both adversaries and allies. Soviet doctrine used the risk of nuclear and conventional war with NATO as a camouflage to threaten armed actions in both Germanys in support of the East German Communist Party. Soviet doctrine also threatened military intervention against political opponents of the other communist regimes of Eastern Europe. The strategy also sought to pre-empt further defections from the Warsaw Pact, such as those of Albania and Romania. Until 1987-88, Soviet doctrine required victory on NATO territory as the only option compatible with the maskirovka necessary for offensive action within the Soviet alliance system.

During the years of the 'Second Cold War', the Chief of the Soviet General Staff presided over the 1983 publication of the *Military Encyclopedic Dictionary*. This single-volume work was a condensation and partial revision of the eight-volume *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* (1976-80). At the time of publication the *Dictionary* was the *summa theologica* of Soviet military doctrine as it had evolved in the period since Stalin's death. The volume contained more than 14,000 entries. The Main Editorial Commission of the *Dictionary* provided the following introductory guidance for a non-alphabetical reading of the volume's priorities. The Commission, chaired by Chief of the General Staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, declared:¹

This *Dictionary* reflects the most important decisions of the CPSU and the Soviet Government on military questions. It also reflects the Leninist legacy on the defense of the socialist fatherland.

It features articles on the problems of war and politics, military economics, military science, military art, the organization and development of a national defense system [*voennoe stroitel'stvo*], military history, military technology and military geography.

The Leninist Legacy on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland!!!! Judging by electronic searches of Western databases,² during the Cold War and afterwards there has not been one Western article or book on 'the Leninist legacy on the "defense of the socialist fatherland"'. The concept was barely mentioned and never extensively discussed in any of the more influential Western studies of 'Soviet military doctrine'. Was the reference to the 'Leninist legacy on "the defense of the socialist fatherland"' dispensable verbiage that the Chief of the Soviet General Staff and his colleagues carelessly inserted into their identification of the thematic content of the *Military Encyclopedic Dictionary*? The answer offered by this study is that the 'defense of the socialist fatherland' was a code for the military-political component of Soviet military doctrine from 1959 until Gorbachev's doctrinal changes of 1987-88. This doctrine used the risk of nuclear and conventional war with NATO as a camouflage to threaten armed actions in both Germanys in support of the East German Communist Party and to threaten military intervention against comparable political opponents of the other communist regimes of Eastern Europe. As demonstrated in 1989, political upheavals in the peoples' democracies were also assaults on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Soviet military had defended the CPSU against this threat since the 1953 uprisings in East Germany.

In making this analysis of Soviet/Warsaw Pact policy, the author is aware that there is no demand whatsoever for yet another interpretation of 'Soviet military doctrine'. To proceed with an uphill battle: according to Soviet sources, cited regularly by Western commentators,³ Soviet military doctrine was a constantly evolving synthesis of a military-political component and a military-technical component. The two components mutually influenced each other in the overall formulation of all the policies subsumed at any given moment as Soviet military doctrine. However, the Soviets identified the military-political component as the more influential of the two.⁴ In his study of Soviet military doctrine,⁵ Andrei Kokoshin, a deputy minister of defense under Yeltsin, and a prominent civilian defense expert under Gorbachev,⁶ makes the general argument that in the Soviet era political objectives (the policy of the CPSU) always drove the formulation of Soviet military strategy, not the other way around.⁷

Western analysts produced a voluminous literature covering Soviet treatises on the military-technical component of doctrine: military economics, military science, military art, the organization and development

of a national defense system [*voennoe stroitel'stvo*], military history, military technology and military geography. What particularly caught the attention of Western readers were the published Soviet discussions, beginning in 1962, of how to achieve victory in a nuclear war.⁸ The eventual result was a *de-facto* Western consensus (even among Western doves) that before Gorbachev the political component of Soviet doctrine was the concept of the victory of socialism over capitalism.⁹

No doubt every leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, including Gorbachev, believed that this was the goal of the whole Soviet project. But the CPSU never assigned this grand historical mission to the Soviet Defense Ministry.¹⁰ Of course, the Soviet Defense Ministry did work constantly on the problems of how to win battles and wars, nuclear and conventional. The argument here is that the victory of socialism over capitalism was not the military-political content of Soviet doctrine during the Cold War.

This specific political component of Soviet military doctrine from 1959 until 1987–88 were the goals collectively described as 'defense of the socialist fatherland' and its interchangeable twin, 'defense of the gains of socialism'. These parallel concepts, aimed at overlapping audiences, were sometimes presented under the grand rubric of 'the Marxist-Leninist Teaching on War and the Armed Forces'.¹¹ The political objectives encompassed by 'defense of the socialist fatherland' explain the formulation from 1959 to 1987–88 of an offensive 'military art' (strategy, operational art and tactics), including the public proclamation of an offensive strategy for the use of nuclear weapons to fight and win a war on foreign soil. The source of the pre-1987 offensive thrust of the military-technical component of Soviet military doctrine was not in the 'objective' or 'scientific' or 'historical' conclusions of Soviet military science/Soviet military art/Soviet military strategy as disciplines unto themselves.¹² Nor was the offensive posture of Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces derived from a deductive logic whose first premise was that victory is possible in a nuclear war.¹³ The offensive posture of Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces derived from the military implications of the political goals collectively described as the defense of the socialist fatherland.

The Dictionary Definition of Soviet Security Objectives

In its entry¹⁴ for 'defense of the socialist fatherland', the *Dictionary* declared that defense of the socialist fatherland was 'not only a national but international mission'.¹⁵

The *Dictionary* spoke of the 'overlap of the national and international mission of defense of the socialist fatherland, as embodied in the Warsaw

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Pact.¹⁶ Examples of this overlap of the missions of the Soviet and allied armies mentioned by the *Dictionary* included '... prevention of the restoration of capitalism in Hungary [1956], suppression of 'the quiet counterrevolution' in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic [1968]'. Support for North Korea, Cuba and Vietnam were other examples. The entry for defense of the socialist fatherland explained that in peacetime 'imperialists and their allies attempt by military or other means to break the positions of socialism and to export counterrevolution ...'.¹⁷ The proper Soviet response against such efforts to export counterrevolution is '... the complete destruction of the aggressor ... by the mobilization of all the forces of a country (or the coalition of socialist countries).'¹⁸

The 1983 *Dictionary* also provided an entry¹⁹ for 'the defense of socialism'. The *Dictionary* explained that the defense of socialism has 'two aspects:

the external – defense from encroachments from outside and the preparation of a country (or the community of socialist countries) for the rebuffing of possible military attack; and

the internal – the struggle against internal counterrevolution which as a rule relies on international reaction.²⁰

This concept is applicable both in one country and in the framework of the entire socialist community ... The defense of the socialist fatherland is an internationalist task.²¹ This entry added that the Warsaw Pact was 'a manifestation of the international unity of the fraternal peoples directed toward the defense of socialism'.²²

The operational concepts of the defense of the socialist fatherland and defense of the gains of socialism were sometimes translated in the West as 'the Brezhnev doctrine'.²³ As Vadim Medvedev, one of Gorbachev's key civilian advisers, observed, the 'Brezhnev doctrine' existed long before Brezhnev came to power.²⁴ Medvedev dated this policy to the 1953 Soviet intervention in East Germany.²⁵ General Anatolii Gribkov, former Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact, published in 1998 a history of the Warsaw Pact in which he included chapters on the Berlin crises from 1948 to 1961. General Gribkov viewed the armed clashes of 1953 as just one part of a spectrum of recurring threats to very existence of the GDR.²⁶ In another chapter, devoted to the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956, General Gribkov offered the following explanation why the Soviets intervened: 'The loss of Hungary would have been a detonator for the other countries of the Warsaw Pact'.²⁷ By this he meant the collapse of rule by local communist parties and the destruction of the political basis for the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe.²⁸

These Soviet formulas for defense of socialism and defense of the socialist fatherland can be read as ideological justifications for Stalinist imperialism. But the Warsaw Pact/Soviet doctrinal formulas can also be read as an attempt during the period from 1955 to 1962 to construct a reliable military shield²⁹ against the urgent internal and external security threats – political and military – faced by the ruling parties of the greater socialist fatherland. The Soviet military shield gave leaders such as Imre Nagy of Hungary a chance to build a socio-economic order reflecting the more humane traditions of European Marxism. The Berlin Wall provided such a shield for Ulbricht and Honecker to attempt to create a national identity for the GDR.

A Knot of Contradictions: Allies and Adversaries in the Warsaw Pact

Stalin had left the German question unresolved. His successors committed themselves to the political survival of the East German party and the GDR – at the cost of a permanent military confrontation with the Federal Republic and its allies. Stalin's heirs probably had no other choice. When the Federal Republic Germany joined NATO in 1955, the Western forces in Berlin and West Germany became allies rather than occupiers. Kurt Schumacher of the Social Democratic Party could no longer deride Konrad Adenauer as 'Chancellor of the Allies'. Adenauer returned from his seat at the NATO table as Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.³⁰

The Soviet forces in East Germany would remain occupiers unless Moscow gave the GDR its own army – and its own military alliance as well. If Soviet forces remained occupation forces, the GDR could never hope for legitimacy – domestic or international. The immediate problem for both the CPSU and the SED was that for political reasons the National People's Army (NVA) would have to be organized as a conscript army, just like the Bundeswehr. Neither in 1955 nor in 1989 did the cohorts of 18–21 year old males in the NVA constitute a solution to the East Germany's security problem. From the beginning to the end, they were a very large part of the security problem.

The West German Bundeswehr, NATO's largest and most powerful conventional force, did not by itself pose an offensive threat to the Soviet and East German troops in the GDR. But the Bundeswehr, a model of military professionalism, posed a deadly ideological threat to East Germany: it claimed to be the sole legitimate heir to the German national military tradition, a tradition deeply rooted in the Prussian lands of the GDR. What did pose a military threat to the German Democratic Republic was the US nuclear guarantee to the Bundeswehr. As crises recurred in East Germany – 1948, 1953, 1958–61 – the Soviet military repeatedly had to

✓ defend the inner-German *status quo* by making threats to both Germans. These threats led to repeated military confrontations with the Americans.

✓ The security of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) was tied not only to the German question but also to the domestic legitimacy of the other ruling communist parties of the Warsaw Pact.

✓ In his account of Gorbachev's changes in Soviet security policy, Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff from 1984–88, wrote that the Soviet security dilemma in Europe grew out of the interaction of the Soviet commitment to maintain the SED in power and the corresponding Soviet commitments to other East European communist regimes. He put it as follows:³¹ (C)

Two fundamental questions for all of 40 years [1945–85] divided the Soviet Union, on the one side, and on the other – the USA, Great Britain, France and then the FRG.

✓ The first question was the unresolved status of the German problem. Instead of one German state after the war two German states were formed – the capitalist FRG and the socialist GDR.

✓ The second question was that governments with socialist regimes had been established in Central Europe ... The West concluded that the formation of socialist regimes in Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia was imposed by the Soviet Union as a result of the stationing of Soviet troops in their territories for one or another period.

The West, for its part, considering that these changes were unnatural, did everything possible so that the results of the second world war in this part of Europe would be overturned to its advantage. For 40 years the visible positive results were unacceptable to the West.

But international contradictions and difficulties gradually developed among the Soviet Union and its allies. The attitudes of the peoples of the East European states gradually changed – and not to the advantage of socialism. ✓

The reasons for these changes and difficulties is not a subject for consideration here. I will note only that an obvious reason was the permanent arms race.

We in the Soviet Union observed with alarm and uneasiness how among the peoples of the GDR, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia dissatisfaction grew with the policies of their governments and the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet Union did a great deal for the strengthening of friendship among them. We often gave economic aid to certain countries.

In the course of many years I was closely linked with the military leadership of the allied countries, especially with the chiefs of the general staffs. They made clear their misgivings, very carefully, it is true. No clear outcome to these mounting difficulties was anticipated.

Thus the knot of contradictions between East and West, tied more than 40 years ago remained fundamental. These contradictions became the main obstacle [in 1985] for a new foreign policy of the USSR.'

Before Gorbachev's ascent to power, the Soviet commitment to maintain other pro-Soviet communist regimes in power regularly raised for the Soviet General Staff the problems of preparing for military interventions and threatening interventions: Hungary (1956), Poland (1956) Czechoslovakia (1968), Afghanistan (1979) and Poland (1980-81), Poland (1989), East Germany (1989), and the rest of Eastern Europe (1989).

The argument here is that after 1956 the Soviet General Staff did not approach this question of preparing for a military on an *ad hoc* basis. The authors of the Soviet military doctrine that emerged during 1959-62 directly addressed this question.

In his 1998 study of the Warsaw Pact, General Gribkov, former Chief of the Warsaw Pact Staff, offered detailed analyses of the crises of intervention from 1956 to 1981. His analyses are too complex to cover here, but at least three points emerge from his discussions. One was the importance of having Soviet forces intervene at the earliest possible moment to secure control over local armories and other logistical/communications nodes.³² The second was to preempt organized military resistance led by the local professional officer corps.³³ A third was to have a local political leadership that would support Soviet intervention on the basis of a common political agenda.³⁴ A fourth was to have some assurance that the West would respond only passively to the Soviet intervention.³⁵

Meeting such objectives for intervention was comparatively easy in East Germany, given the massive size of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (20 divisions) and the small size of the East German army (six divisions), by several measures the smallest of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armies. (There was, however, the risk of a confrontation with the West Germans and with the United States). Meeting the objectives for intervention in Hungary was relatively easy after doubling the size of the Soviet garrison in 1957 to four divisions and a downsizing of the Hungarian armed forces, which was eventually rebuilt to a six-division force.

But meeting such objectives was not so easy in Poland, where the Soviets had only 2 divisions in country compared to Poland's 13 divisions. Nor was it was easy in the countries with no Soviet garrisons in 1959-62:

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Czechoslovakia, with 10 divisions of its own; Bulgaria with 8 divisions and no common border except the Black Sea; Albania, accessible only through seas controlled by NATO; Romania, from which Soviet troops had withdrawn in 1958. And Romania, as General Gribkov noted, was a nettlesome ally, constantly disrupting joint planning in the Warsaw Pact.³⁶

Romania ceased participating in Warsaw Pact exercises in 1964, barely two years after the beginning of the program of joint exercises. It developed a military doctrine premised on a non-nuclear guerrilla struggle, with no expectation of support from its Warsaw Pact allies. Romania refused to participate in the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia, and in fact mobilized its own territorial defense system as a show of defiance. Albania's response to the 1968 intervention was even more defiant – it formally withdrew from the Pact after having boycotted all Pact activities since 1960. Albania, like its neighbor Yugoslavia, demonstrated that meeting the national security concerns of an East European communist state did not necessarily require a military alliance with the USSR. According to the Yugoslavs, a well-conceived military doctrine of national defense of national territory by national means could meet the security needs of ruling communist regimes in East Europe, particularly when complemented by skillful diplomacy toward some combination of the NATO states, China and the Third World states courted by the USSR. Albania and Romania developed doctrines of territorial defense comparable to that of Yugoslavia, adjusted for their particular situations.

To threaten to intervene in any of the Warsaw Pact countries without Soviet garrisons – or in Poland – would require a Soviet capacity for rapid and massive military intervention. In other words, an offensive posture for a large conventional force. To make an overt military threat specifically limited to the societies of Eastern Europe and the two Germanys would have been to subvert the political regimes of East Germany and Eastern Europe. Or, as General Gribkov observed, after every successful Soviet military intervention, there were inevitably long-term negative consequences.³⁷ The Soviets encountered the counter-productive political dilemma of making open military threats during the Polish crisis of 1980–81.³⁸

In the late 1950s, the solution to this dilemma was to hide the Soviet military threat to Eastern Europe in the dangerous and costly charade of an imminent NATO–Warsaw Pact war to be fought mainly on NATO territory, possibly with the use of nuclear weapons. NATO would predictably respond with its own military countermeasures. The Soviets could then justify their own offensive force posture as a response to an alleged threat from NATO. To have engaged NATO in a reciprocal effort to place mutual restraints on alliance military capabilities would have been to place restraints on the Soviet capability to intervene in Eastern Europe and on the Soviet capability

to intimidate the societies of East and West Germany into accepting the *status quo* of two Germanys.

If codified in an alliance military doctrine, the requirement of an offensive posture could simultaneously configure Soviet forces for interventions while pre-empting the proliferation of East European doctrines of national defense by national means – the doctrines adopted by Yugoslavia, Albania and Romania. This is not to say the Soviet General Staff did not focus most of Soviet expenditures on the *military* potential of NATO, the United States and US capabilities outside of the NATO area. It is to say that that Soviet military could not plan on enlisting their putative East European allies in a campaign against NATO without first pre-empting the *political* threats to the ruling communist parties who agreed to second their armed forces to the Warsaw Pact command. The Romanians refused to do so, as did Albania, another signatory of the Warsaw Pact. The commitments of the remaining loyal Warsaw Pact allies to the Soviet order of battle could be irrevocably destroyed by what General Gribkov identified as 'the detonator effect': not intervening to preserve communist rule. The Gorbachev leadership encountered 'the detonator effect' after the Solidarity government came to power in Poland in August of 1989: no ruling communist parties, no East European armies available for the Warsaw Pact order of battle against NATO, not even for a defensive posture. But this was the least of Gorbachev's problems after the 'detonator effect' of 1989. In the greater socialist fatherland, all that was solid had melted into air.

The Leninist legacy of the defense of the socialist fatherland reflected an historical awareness that an appeal to defend a 'fatherland' was more likely to evoke loyalty from Soviet military personnel than an appeal to defend a regime responsible for the 'gains of socialism'.³⁹ Such an appeal was the optimum possible justification for intervention in an allied socialist country – and for maintaining the offensive posture necessary for such intervention. The military-political concept of 'defense of the socialist fatherland' provided not only the motivations but also the justifications for the relentlessly offensive thrust⁴⁰ of the military-technical component of Soviet and Warsaw Pact doctrine from 1959 until 1987–88. By definition, offense meant taking the war to the enemy's territory.⁴¹

Maskirovka: Strategic Doctrine as Strategic Deception

The offensive thrust of Soviet strategy, including the concept of victory in a nuclear war, was a strategic deception – a *maskirovka*⁴² – designed to camouflage the Soviet offensive threat to Eastern Europe and the two Germanys. The *maskirovka* produced a Warsaw Pact order of battle that combined both offensive force posture and offensive doctrinal pose. Such

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✓ deceptions were hardly out of character for Khrushchev. In the 1956 Suez crisis he had threatened nuclear strikes against Britain and France. In the late 1950s, he made exaggerated claims about Soviet missile production and capabilities. And in 1961 he attempted his greatest deception – the secret installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba.⁴³

✓ After Khrushchev, Soviet arms control policy added another layer to the *maskirovka*. So did skillful diplomacy on the part of the European bureaus of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.⁴⁴ This diplomacy produced the Soviet-German treaties of 1970–72 and the Helsinki Accords of 1975, agreements that the Western signatories hoped would end the Cold War. But Warsaw Pact statements from the late 1950s to the late 1980s, including the statements of 1987, ritually repeated the formulas of the late 1950s about German revanchism, American imperialism and NATO's preparations to launch a war of aggression.⁴⁵ Until the 1987 treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces, American hawks rightly complained that any Western efforts to draw down the arms race were reciprocated only by further build-ups on the Soviet side, particularly in regard to nuclear weapons.

✓ A principal focus⁴⁶ of the Kokoshin study of Soviet strategic thought from 1917 to 1990 is on what Kokoshin saw as the egregious failure of the Soviet command to come to terms with scientific facts⁴⁷ about the use of nuclear weapons. Kokoshin found this failure almost incomprehensible given the great creativity he saw in pre-World War II Soviet strategic thinking and the remarkable performances of Soviet commanders during the war. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet Defense Ministry assigned some of the brightest veterans of World War II to the tasks of writing detailed scholarly studies of recent military history. And, as Kokoshin well knew, Soviet military officers had closely studied all the Western literature on nuclear weapons. Yet in studying the dynamics of nuclear war, the intellectual elite of the Soviet officer corps arrived at published conclusions substantially different from those of their Western counterparts.

✓ There is now some evidence that the highest-level Soviet military officials deliberately suppressed studies conducted by the Soviet General Staff that concluded that nuclear use on a European battlefield would be catastrophic for the USSR. According to interviews of Soviet officers conducted by the BDM Corporation after the Cold War, military experts on the Soviet General Staff during the Brezhnev era had concluded that fighting and winning a nuclear war was a chimera. In a review of these interviews John Hines, an American expert on Soviet and Warsaw Pact doctrine, came to the following judgements:⁴⁸

The conclusions of the General Staff analysts and other officers involved [in these studies] was essentially that nuclear use was operationally counter-productive and generally self-destructive. ✓

... Marshals Grechko and Kulikov ... knew, understood and believed that nuclear use at any level by either side would be catastrophic for the Soviet Armed Forces and the Soviet state they were required to protect.

These senior Minister of Defense and General Staff generals nevertheless formally rejected the analysis to which they were exposed and typically suppressed it ...

To officially acknowledge that nuclear use was senseless and basically catastrophic would require several changes in the entire Soviet military-political economic system that were completely unacceptable to the senior officers who were the products and beneficiaries of the system.

Grechko, defense minister from 1967 to 1976, had served as Commander of the Warsaw Pact from 1960 to 1967 and before that as Commander of the Ground Forces. Kulikov, like Grechko, had once commanded the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. He served as Grechko as Chief of the Soviet General Staff from 1971 to 1977, when he became Commander of the Warsaw Pact, a post he held until early 1989. Hines in does not raise the possibility that the requirements of a Soviet/Warsaw Pact *maskirovka* might also have been a reason for Grechko and Kulikov to ignore the findings of their own experts. ✓

Hines reports the experiences of Vitalii Tsygichko, a general staff officer/scientist who participated in a special 'nuclear winter' study. The 'nuclear winter' study concluded that the use of nuclear weapons on the central European battlefield would have deadly contamination consequences for soldiers and civilians throughout the Warsaw Pact, including the USSR. In 1973 Tsygichko briefed General Viktor Kulikov on the study. Kulikov, then chief of the Soviet General Staff, suppressed the study and forced Tsygichko into retirement as a civilian scientist at an academic institute. Hines makes the following observations:⁴⁹ ✓

Tsygichko pointed out that one of the consequences of this suppression was that the finds were never incorporated into routine Soviet exercises. As a consequence, exercise maps typically depicted neat, manageable balloon-shaped contamination patterns that could be circumvented easily by army commanders ... ✓

Vitalii Tsygichko stressed that in his confrontation with Kulikov and his generals, it was clear to him that they all understood the correctness of his findings but were unwilling to accept and

disseminate them because of what those findings implied for the General Staff in the areas of force development, doctrine, military investment, etc.

Again, Grechko and Kulikov may have ignored their experts for a reason in addition to those suggested by Tsygichko and Hines: to protect a strategic *maskirovka* that kept Soviet forces poised – in public view – for rapid offensives into Eastern Europe and the two Germanys.

In his study of Soviet strategic thought, Andrei Kokoshin, now the director of an institute in Moscow and also a member of the Russian parliament, also marveled at the crude undifferentiated threat analysis of the NATO states by the Soviet military in the period from Stalin's death to 1987.⁵⁰ The threat analyses of the Ministry of Defense remained essentially those of the late 1950s, despite all the achievements of Soviet diplomacy and arms control over the period from 1955 to 1985 and even 1987.⁵¹ According to Kokoshin, even Stalin's sidekick Marshal Klement Voroshilov (of whom Kokoshin has a low opinion) was capable of far more insightful threat analysis than were the principal compilers of post-Stalin Soviet military doctrine⁵² – Marshals Malinovskii, Sokolovskii, Grechko, Kulikov, Ogarkov, and Ustinov (Had the Soviet Ministry of Defense been so inclined, Marshal Voroshilov could have provided Cold War threat assessments. He died in 1969 at the age of 88, after having served as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet from 1953 to 1960).

In fairness to the authors of Soviet Cold War threat assessments, the events of 1989 did confirm their worst-case threat analyses. But this threat did not come from the armies of NATO. It came from the persistent socio-economic mismanagement of the ruling East European communist parties. These parties had been protected from their own policy debacles by Soviet military guarantees and Soviet economic subsidies. The reliable shield of the Warsaw Pact had permitted the indefinite postponement of internal solutions to the domestic problems that made the shield necessary. Of course, the West offered substantial indirect support to anti-Soviet political developments in Eastern Europe, most notably in the case of support for the Solidarity Trade Union movement. Soviet treatises on the defense of the socialist fatherland offered chapter and verse on such imperialist intrigues.⁵³

In a broad sense, Soviet military doctrine did correctly assess the security threats to the interdependent system of ruling communist parties of the greater socialist fatherland.

In a narrow military sense, the revolutions of 1989 were the failures of the Soviet and fraternal armies to defend the gains of socialism in the socialist fatherland. And in an even narrower sense, this failure can be traced to Gorbachev's re-writing of the military-political component Soviet

military doctrine. Under Gorbachev, the new content of the political component of doctrine consisted of the prevention of nuclear war and the preservation of peace as the core concepts of 'universal human values'.⁵⁴ In practice, this meant ending the Soviet capability to wage war on the territories of Western Europe. And this in turn entailed – for both military and political reasons – a drastic reduction in the Soviet capability for military intervention in Eastern Europe.

As former Chief of the General Staff Marshal Akhromeev explained in 1991, Gorbachev's foreign policy required a new military doctrine based on two new concepts: not initiating attacks on NATO and not intervening in Eastern Europe. Akhromeev made the following observations about the relationship between Gorbachev's new policies of non-intervention in Eastern Europe and Gorbachev's new defensive military posture *vis-à-vis* NATO:⁵⁵

It is important to note that the Soviet leadership did not act unilaterally. It coordinated the bases of this policy with the leaders of the allied countries, specifically its line of the halting of any future interference on the part of the USSR in their affairs, understanding in this regard specifically the prevention of our military pressure and armed interference in internal processes, which could take place in these countries.

Then we jointly with our allies worked out a new military doctrine of the states of the Warsaw Pact.

... I am not able to judge with confidence whether it was clear to the leaders of the states of the Warsaw Pact all the possible consequences of these developments.

It was obvious to me that non-interference of the USSR in their internal affairs in specific conditions could lead to sudden changes, to such changes in the state and social order of their countries, which would basically transform Europe ...

To say it one more time: For the Soviet military, it was not possible to renounce an offensive posture against Western Europe without first making peace with Eastern Europe.⁵⁶ As Akhromeev noted in 1991, the Soviet state actually enjoyed a much greater degree of external security once Moscow renounced its political domination of Eastern Europe, its forward military bases and its offensive posture against NATO.⁵⁷ But the 1989 events in East Europe had a devastating impact on the political formulas of the CPSU. Nationalists in the Baltic States immediately raised demands for further deconstruction of the socialist fatherland.

A Brief Etymology of the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland

The leaders of the CPSU always used the term 'the socialist fatherland' as a broadly collective noun. In February 1918 Lenin issued a decree entitled 'The Socialist Fatherland in Danger!' This was an appeal directed to all the national groups facing German forces on the territories of the former Romanov empire.⁵⁸ During the Khrushchev era, the concept of 'defense of the socialist fatherland' evoked the 'Great Fatherland War', the Soviet term to cover two related military-political processes. The first was the common struggle of all the nationalities of the union republics of the USSR against the Nazi invaders. During the Great Fatherland War the union republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus briefly had their own national divisions, as they had from 1924 to 1938. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania also briefly had their own national formations, organized on Russian soil.

The second process consisted of the military campaigns not only of the USSR during World War II but also of all the European and Asian communist parties that emerged victorious in their struggles against the aggressor states of Germany, Italy and Japan. This included the national divisions of East Europeans organized by the Soviets.

Soviet sources of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras never specified the specific geographic boundaries of the 'socialist fatherland'. But they did specify the primary mission of the Soviet Armed Forces as that of defending this zone, however indeterminate its borders. As the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* later explained this period, 'The establishment of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 placed before Soviet military strategy a new task – the working out of the common bases of strategy in the countries of the socialist community, in which the international and national interests of the socialist countries are organically fused.'⁵⁹ These two concerns – defending the state interests of the USSR and defending the ruling communist parties dependent on Soviet military guarantees – fused into the concept of 'defense of the socialist fatherland' (intended mainly for Soviet audiences) and the parallel concept of 'defense of the gains of socialism' (intended mainly for Warsaw Pact audiences).

The catalysts of this fusion included the (1) actions of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany in 1953 under Marshal Grechko's command; (2) the conclusions drawn from the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956; (3) the mobilization of the Polish army in 1956 to resist the intervention threatened by Khrushchev; (4) the complex East German–West German dynamics of the 'Berlin crisis' of the late 1950s that finally ended with the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961; (5) the *de facto* defections of Albania and Romania from the Warsaw Pact in the late 1950s and their adoption of strategies based on national control of national armed forces for the defense of national territory; (6) the support of China for the Albanian and

Romanian defections, including Chinese support for the defense concept of 'reliance on one's own forces'.

The first CPSU Congress to identify the concept of defense of the socialist fatherland as the basis of Soviet military policy was the 1959 21st Party Congress, a meeting that followed the attempted coup of 1957 against Khrushchev. It preceded the 1960 meeting of world communist parties at which the Sino-Soviet dispute began to come into public view. The 21st Congress took place simultaneously with the initial formulation of a post-Stalin Soviet military doctrine by officers of the Soviet General Staff.⁶⁰ The program adopted by the 21st Congress specified 'Defense of the Socialist Fatherland' as the mission for the Soviet Armed Forces. The Congress also endorsed the parallel concept of defending 'the gains of socialism'.⁶¹

Without mentioning a specific date, Kokoshin claims that during the late 1950s and early 1960s Soviet military doctrine took on the missions of defending 'three empires': one within the non-Slavic zone of multinational Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, particularly in regard to Central Asia; one within the zone of the people's democracies – the Warsaw Pact states plus Mongolia; and one in the Third World.⁶² Kokoshin did not, however, discuss 'the defense of the socialist fatherland' or any equivalent strategic concept that might be construed as the political component of Soviet military doctrine. Nor did Kokoshin identify the common feature of the three empires: ruling communist parties simultaneously dependent on the CPSU and the Soviet military.

The argument here is that planning for defense of the greater socialist fatherland was an effort to provide a Soviet version of 'extended deterrence' to the three empires identified by Kokoshin. Defense of the 'second empire' had been a *de facto* policy since 1953. A commitment to the emerging 'third empire' in the third world represented a momentous expansion of the mission of the Soviet Armed Forces. Planning for defense of the greater socialist fatherland was also a means of pre-empting doctrines of 'reliance on one's own forces' like those of Albania in the late 1950s,⁶³ Romania in the early 1960s,⁶⁴ and the Gottward Memorandum' proposals of Czechoslovak officers in 1968.⁶⁵

Marshal Andrei Grechko, Warsaw Pact commander from 1960 to 1967 and then Defense Minister from 1967 to 1976, had declared in a 1964 book, *The Nuclear Age and War*, that a new era in Soviet military doctrine had begun in 1960 when Soviet doctrine formally took on the mission of defending not only the USSR but also the greater socialist community.⁶⁶ In *The Nuclear Age and War*, Grechko explained that the initial development nuclear weapons and Soviet missile delivery systems was intended not just for the protection of the state interests of the USSR but to meet the requirement 'to defend the whole socialist camp from constant threat on the part of the imperialist aggressors'.⁶⁷

According to Grechko,⁶⁸ the state charter for this expanded doctrinal mission was Khrushchev's speech to the Supreme Soviet in January 1960. This speech put the mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in the following context: (1) Khrushchev's warnings about the intensified attempts of the West German revanchists to use NATO for their schemes 'to revise state frontiers in Europe'; (2) his arguments that nuclear weapons delivered by missiles would be sufficient to provide for the security of the USSR and its allies; (3) his announcement of a cut of 1,200,000 personnel from the Soviet military; (4) his proposal to further reduce the size of deployed Soviet ground forces by reviving the 'militia' concept of the 1920s (roughly comparable to US National Guard units); (5) his call for universal and complete disarmament.⁶⁹

According to Grechko⁷⁰ and Defense Minister Rodion Malinovskii,⁷¹ the most important charter for Soviet military doctrine was the program of the 22nd Party Congress (1961). Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott identify the program of the 22nd Congress as the basis for the emphasis on the offensive use of nuclear weapons, an emphasis that they saw as the defining characteristic the military-technical component of Soviet doctrine through the late 1980s.⁷² The program of the 22nd Congress endorsed three different variations of a common terminology: defense of the socialist fatherland, defense of the socialist motherland, and defense of the socialist native land.⁷³ The party program dropped the use of the term 'defense of the gains of socialism'. The Congress identified the security threat to the USSR as the 'mad plans for the liquidation of the Soviet Union and other socialist states through the instrument of war'. The strategic response? 'Decisive and complete destruction' of any aggressor who attacked any of the fraternal socialist states. The Congress resolution declared that '... defense of the Socialist Fatherland, the strengthening of the defense of the USSR and of the power of the Soviet Armed Forces is the holy duty of the party ... The Soviet Union regards as its international duty to secure together with the other socialist countries the reliable defense and security of the entire socialist camp.'⁷⁴

In 1961, five years after the Hungarian uprising – while the cement was still hardening in the Berlin Wall – what was the alternative to providing security guarantees to the fraternal parties? The alternative was what General Gribkov identified in his 1998 book as the 'detonator effect'. But the 22nd Congress also sought a political solution to the explosive potential of failed domestic policies in the provinces of the socialist fatherland. Khrushchev promised the members of the CPSU and the delegates from the fraternal parties that by 1980 they would enjoy the vast material abundance of a fully developed communist society.

Had this vision materialized, the defense of the socialist fatherland in 1980 probably would have required nothing more than enough honor guards

to participate in May Day parades throughout the Warsaw Pact. But in 1980 the Polish Communist Party faced what proved by 1989 to be a fatal threat to the entire Soviet bloc – the anti-communist labor movement organized by Solidarity. In 1980–81 the threat from Solidarity required massive Soviet military maneuvers around Poland's borders and a threatened intervention – which NATO actively tried to prevent by political measures.

The 22nd Congress also made another promise: to provide the Soviet military with 'the most advanced means of defense of the Motherland – atomic and thermonuclear weapons, missiles of all ranges, all types of military technology and weaponry at the most advanced levels'.⁷⁵ After the confrontations of the 1961 Berlin Crisis and of the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis, Khrushchev scrapped his 1960 plans for downsizing the Soviet ground forces and the Soviet Navy. And after Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, all the Soviet service branches demanded delivery of the weaponry promised by the 22nd Congress. The CPSU delivered.

Under the auspices of Defense Minister Rodion Malinovskii in 1962 and 1963, the Ministry of Defense published the military art of the new doctrine as successive versions of *Military Strategy*, edited by Marshal V.D. Sokolovskii.⁷⁶ This was the first official publication of a formal doctrine since the mid 1920s. Sokolovskii had retired in 1960 from his previous assignment as Chief of the General Staff to head the Inspectorate of the Defense Ministry. Just why the Defense Ministry decided to publish a doctrine for the nuclear age remains a question of scholarly debate. Andrei Kokoshin writes, 'One of the primary implicit goals of the [Sokolovskii] book was to impress Westerners with Soviet military power. As some contemporaries have recalled, Khrushchev directed the team of authors (via Malinovskii) "to frighten them to death".'⁷⁷ Whether or not Khrushchev did give such orders, the Sokolovskii text emphasized the offensive use of nuclear weapons from battlefield targets to economic targets deep inside enemy territory (with the qualification that the Soviet offensive began in response to the unleashing of war by the imperialists). A plethora of complementary texts made the same points until the Gorbachev era.⁷⁸ (In 1977 Brezhnev added the qualification that the Soviets would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. However, he also insisted that the Soviet military would use them decisively once the imperialists had unleashed nuclear war.)

In 1968 Marshal Sokolovskii published a third edition⁷⁹ under the new Defense Minister, Andrei Grechko. Each edition of the Sokolovskii text insisted on a formula that appeared in every other authoritative text on Soviet strategy: the war anticipated by the Soviet armed forces would be a coalition war and Soviet military strategy was a strategy for coalition war.⁸⁰ The argument here is that the military-political or military-technical

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component of the Sokolovskii texts read as a doctrine for war in Europe – not for invading Japan, not for invading North America or any other possible theater. Marshal Sokolovskii wrote his texts in large part to provide the doctrine to coordinate and integrate the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact. This doctrine, with its emphasis on the nuclear dimensions of coalition warfare, also sought to close off further defections from the Warsaw Pact, like that of Albania, which formally withdrew from the Pact in 1968 to protest the Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia.

According to Oleg Penkovskii, a defector close to the Soviet General Staff, one key aspect of the Sokolovskii doctrine was inclusion of East European forces in the new doctrine and new force for the Western Theater.⁸¹ According to General Gribkov, former Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact, war planning for the joint Soviet-East European forces was assigned to the Tenth Department of the Soviet General Staff rather than to the Warsaw Pact Staff.⁸² The logic for assigning war planning to the Soviet General Staff rather than the Warsaw Pact Staff probably had something to do with the doctrinal emphasis on the contingency of nuclear war. We now have documentary evidence that at least three Warsaw Pact states – The German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia – had adopted offensive strategies for nuclear war in the early 1960s. Beginning in 1962, joint exercises of the Warsaw Pact 'northern tier' states (East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia) included simulations of the use of nuclear weapons, based on Soviet doctrine.⁸³ These 'northern tier' strategic missions complemented the nuclear war plans outlined by the Sokolovskii texts. The East Germans were to assist in the conquest of West Germany.⁸⁴ GDR nuclear war plans included bringing along new street signs for captured West German cities.⁸⁵ The Poles were to occupy Denmark after loosing a barrage of nuclear weapons on Danish cities.⁸⁶ And the Czechoslovak army, which had never fired on an enemy since its formation in 1918, was to blast its way across radioactive battlefields in Germany and France to capture Lyon on the ninth day of World War III.⁸⁷ In other words, the Sokolovskii discussions about nuclear war were translated into war plans for Warsaw Pact allies practised in the form of joint Warsaw Pact exercises.

Just after the 1963 Sokolovskii volume the Soviet Defense Ministry published Grechko's 1964 book, *War and the Nuclear Age*. Grechko was commander of the Warsaw Pact. The book included a chapter on conducting nuclear war from the commander of each Soviet service branch plus the commanders of special forces such as airborne troops, armored troops, railroad troops, signals corps and civil defense. In his lead chapter, Warsaw Pact Commander Grechko began with citations from the statement of the 22nd Party Congress that defense of the socialist fatherland was '... the holy duty of the party ...'. A chapter by Marshal Sergei Biriuzov, who had just

become Chief of the General Staff after serving as Commander of the strategic Rocket Forces, endorsed not only 'defense of the socialist fatherland but also "defense of the socialist motherland"'.⁸⁸ He also made clear that these concepts extended to 'the countries of socialism'. There were no East European contributors to the Grechko volume of 1964. But the book provided the East European colleagues of the Warsaw Pact commander with a manual for configuring virtually every kind of military specialty to meet the requirements of nuclear war.

Beginning in 1965, a series⁸⁹ of authoritative book-length publications were devoted to the topic of the defense of the socialist fatherland. These texts, including joint Soviet-East European studies of World War II collaboration of Soviet and East European military personnel, provided materials for coordination political indoctrination programs of the Warsaw Pact.⁹⁰ The first of the new book-length texts on defense of the socialist fatherland was translated into English by the US Air Force as *The Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland*, edited by Major-General K. Bockkarev. This volume declared:⁹¹

'... the problem of defending the Socialist Fatherland is no longer that of a single country, but has become the sacred duty of the peoples of the whole world system of Socialism.

This was also reflected in the Program of the CPSU which states that 'The Soviet Union considers itself internationally obliged to guarantee, together with the other socialist countries, the reliable defense and security of the whole Socialist camp.

When he became minister of defense of 1967, Marshal Grechko announced his promotion in an inaugural message entitled 'The Victory of the Leninist Ideas on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland'.⁹² By the 1970s, *Voennaia Mysl'*, the classified journal of the Soviet General Staff, was publishing a regular series of articles under the heading of 'The Leninist Teaching on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland'.⁹³

The materials for books and articles on the defense of the socialist fatherland came mainly from the Institute of Military History, established in 1966. The Institute was jointly administered by the Ministry of Defense, the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Armed Forces (a branch of the CPSU Central Committee) and the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The soldier-scholars of this institute produced well-documented (though narrowly focused) historical studies of the Civil War of 1917-22, the Great Fatherland War, the non-Soviet socialist armies, the development of the Warsaw Pact (WP) and the ideological and political concepts uniting the WP forces.⁹⁴ The Institute carried out much of the work for the multiple

histories of the Great Fatherland War, for the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* (1976–79) and for the *Military-Encyclopedic Dictionary* (1983).

One theme of these multitudinous studies was that each communist party that had succeeded in coming to power over the period from 1917–49 did so with ‘internationalist’ military support, either substantial or symbolic, from an allied communist party.⁹⁵ This analytical interpretation covered the communist parties of the nominally independent states that in 1922 formally merged to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.⁹⁶ It covered as well as the parties of the people’s democracies toward the end of the Great Fatherland War.⁹⁷ Another theme developed by the scholars of the Institute was that each ruling communist party could reliably count on ‘internationalist’ military support to defend its revolution from the reactionary intrigues of internal counterrevolution and international imperialism.⁹⁸

None of this academic literature was academic to the senior commanders who presided over its publication. They had lived it. Malinovskii, Sokolovskii and Grechko⁹⁹ had been present at the creation of the Red Army. Each of them had entered Soviet military service during the wars of 1918–22. After the Nazi invasion, they had put their lives on the line for the liberation and defense of the socialist fatherland. They had shed blood to defeat its enemies. During the various German crises from 1948 to 1961, they had served as Commanders of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany or as Chiefs of the Soviet General Staff. And they codified their victories as editors of the great compilations of Soviet military history and doctrine produced by the soldier-scholars of the Institute of Military History and of the military academies of the USSR. These publications had immediate practical applications. In Soviet military academies Soviet and Warsaw Pact officers studied the military history and the military doctrine of the defense of the socialist fatherland.

During the Brezhnev years, the CPSU programs (1966, 1971, 1976, 1981) dropped Khrushchev’s formula of ‘defense of the socialist fatherland’ in favor of ‘defense of the gains of socialism’.¹⁰⁰ This was often linked to ‘proletarian internationalism and the Socialist community’.¹⁰¹ The conceptual content remained identical to that of the 22nd Congress.

Despite his apparent preference for the formula of ‘defense of the gains of socialism’ in party documents, Brezhnev, did write ‘defense of the socialist fatherland’ into the new Soviet constitution of 1977 along with ‘defense of the gains of socialism’.¹⁰² ‘Defense of the Socialist Fatherland’ was the title of Chapter Five of the new charter, known at the time as the ‘Brezhnev constitution’. Brezhnev had served since 1964 as the chair of the commission to write a new constitution, a commission first headed by Khrushchev. Chapter Five reads in part: ‘The duty of the Armed Forces of the USSR to the people is reliably to defend the socialist Fatherland and to

remain in constant combat readiness, guaranteeing an instant rebuff to any aggressor'.¹⁰³

But Chapter Five of the 1977 Soviet Constitution coyly avoided defining the boundaries of the socialist fatherland. Each of the corresponding 1978 constitutions of each of the Union Republics of the USSR had a chapter on the defense of the socialist fatherland (no borders defined) with articles on the defense of the gains of socialism.¹⁰⁴ With the exception of Romania,¹⁰⁵ the Warsaw Pact states adopted corresponding documents in regard to defense of the socialist fatherland and the gains of socialism.¹⁰⁶

The previous 1936 Soviet constitution had not mentioned a 'socialist fatherland.' It spoke of a 'Fatherland' and a 'Motherland'. Of course, the 'Stalin Constitution' would not have been the Stalin constitution without some Stalinist strictures for the children of the Fatherland and Motherland. Article 133 of the 1936 constitution read, 'Defense of the fatherland shall be the sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR. Treason to the motherland – violation of the oath of allegiance, desertion to the enemy, infliction of harm to the military might of the state, espionage – shall be punished with all the severity of the law as the gravest malefaction'.¹⁰⁷

To recap, the 22nd Party Congress of the CPSU (1961) put its imprimatur on the two components of Soviet military doctrine that remained intertwined until 1987: the political component of defense of the socialist fatherland and the military-technical component of an offensive military art (strategy, operational art and tactics) to achieve decisive victory over the enemy on his own soil, including the possible use of nuclear weapons. This grand synthesis was a doctrine of strategic deception written for the Soviet Armed Forces, for Soviet allies and for Soviet adversaries. In the following years the Soviet Defense Ministry continuously developed not only the military-technical arsenal to implement the doctrine but also a military-historical arsenal. Defense of the socialist fatherland became a constitutional obligation of the Soviet armed forces in 1977. But for the upper levels of the officer corps, defense of the socialist fatherland had been an obligation since the party program of 1959. Beginning in 1960–62, compilations of military doctrine developed the practical military-technical applications of the military-political component of Soviet doctrine.

The Defense of the Socialist Fatherland: Ten Military-Technical Consequences of the Soviet Version of Extended Deterrence

The political component of Soviet doctrine – defense of the socialist fatherland and its twin, defense of the gains of socialism – required making credible military-technical threats to initiate war against the internal and external opponents of the political status quo within the greater socialist

fatherland. This was the Soviet version of extended deterrence. The US version was about the use of a nuclear threat to deter conventional and nuclear threats against allied states. The Soviet version of extended deterrence was about the use of conventional and nuclear threats to protect allied communist elites. (The Soviets of course claimed that the American deterrence policy was designed to protect the ruling classes of West Germany and the other NATO states). For Moscow, making credible military threats to prospective opponents inside and outside the Soviet alliance system was incompatible with the Western concept of extended deterrence – preventing the outbreak of war between alliances.

The USSR and NATO both had to choose from what Thomas Schelling identified as the menu¹⁰⁸ of four possible outcomes to war in the nuclear age: a draw, a defeat, a disaster (mutual destruction) – or a victory. When asked to choose from Schelling's menu of military outcomes, NATO refused the menu – and chose deterrence. That is, NATO chose war prevention by a deliberately ambiguous doctrine of Flexible Response. This left the initiative to Moscow. Moscow also refused Schelling's menu – and chose deception. The deception was that Moscow had chosen military victory on the battlefields of Western Europe. The Soviet strategic *maskirovka* permitted Moscow to camouflage its unambiguous threats to the two Germanys and East Europe under its audacious nuclear/conventional threat to Western Europe and North America. Until 1987–88, Soviet doctrine required victory on NATO territory as the only option compatible with the required *maskirovka* of offensive action beyond Soviet borders.¹⁰⁹

When Gorbachev ordered his marshals to develop a doctrine for preventing war,¹¹⁰ they had no choice but to focus on fighting a defensive war on Warsaw Pact territory.¹¹¹ As Chief of the General Staff Sergei Akhromeev explained in a commentary on the new defensive doctrine of war prevention, 'Only an experienced professional soldier can understand how this theoretical proposition leads to fundamental changes in the situation of the armed forces and fleet and literally to a revolution in their training'.¹¹²

There were at least ten military-technical consequences of the Soviet version of extended deterrence.

The first was configuring Soviet and East European forces for a war to be waged on Western territory. The general staffs of the Warsaw Pact states would in no circumstances focus attention on national defense of national territory by national means. Such strategies raised the prospect of ceding regional military leadership to national commanders, as in NATO. The Soviets opted to defend the socialist fatherland by delivering crushing rebuffs to NATO on NATO territory. This focus on the offensive use of nuclear weapons on West European soil thus gave the military initiative to

the USSR to use military force to defend the political *status quo* in Eastern Europe.

The second effect of the Soviet version of extended deterrence was presenting West German and its NATO allies with a choice between accepting the permanence of the GDR or risking the total devastation of West Germany and its allies. In 1961, the year in which the 22nd Party Congress gave its blessing to the doctrinal concept of the defense of the socialist fatherland, the US President affirmed to the citizens of West Berlin, 'Ich bin ein Berliner!'. And he called up US conventional forces to prove it. This was by no means the first 'Berlin crisis' generating a confrontation between Soviet forces and US over which Berlin was the *ersatz* Berlin. And Kennedy soon announced a new nuclear doctrine- Flexible Response – to reaffirm the reality of American extended deterrence to the Federal Republic. To say this another way: what happened when the CPSU renounced its security guarantee to the SED in 1989? The peaceful resolution of the German question. The end of the Soviet-American conventional military confrontation in Europe. The end of the Soviet-American nuclear arms race.

The third effect of the Soviet version of extended deterrence was extended deterrence of the internal and external enemies of the other communist regimes of the Warsaw Pact states. The loyal political and military leaderships of the Warsaw Pact welcomed this policy as reliable security for their attempts to build socialist societies- and to secure their own privileged positions.

The fourth effect of the Soviet doctrine of extended deterrence was preemption of alternative doctrines of national defense of national territory by national means, as practiced by the independent (and disloyal) communist regimes of Romania, Albania and Yugoslavia. These regimes were politically independent precisely because they did not depend on Soviet military power for security guarantees against either internal or external adversaries. In fact, the most likely external adversary was the USSR. But the Soviets would face an almost impossible task in trying to justify a military assault on a communist state whose communist army offered military resistance in the name of 'defense of the socialist fatherland'. Once such an anti-Soviet military posture was in place, it could defend a non-communist successor regime. In Romania, the political component of doctrine called for national defense of national territory by exclusively national means. This was the Romanian doctrine of 'War of the Entire People', a guerrilla-resistance strategy that required an entirely different defense national system than that of the 'loyal' members of the Warsaw Pact.¹¹³

A fifth effect was to re-secure the commanding heights of policy making for the Soviet General Staff in regard to the general staffs of the Non-Soviet

Warsaw Pact militaries. None of the NSWP forces possessed nuclear warheads for their nuclear-capable delivery systems. According to Warsaw Pact doctrine, these weapons were their main strike forces. The NSWP commanders depended on the Soviets not only for the nuclear warheads but also the entire order of battle built around nuclear warfare.

The sixth effect was to use Soviet military doctrine to impose Soviet military-technical concepts on the national defense systems of the loyal Warsaw Pact states in regard to weaponry, training, officer education, strategy, and military exercises. In addition, the military-political component of doctrine provided the charter for coordination political indoctrination programs of the Warsaw Pact. The practical consequence of accepting the military-political concepts of Soviet doctrine was subordination of national defense ministries to all the joint agencies of the Warsaw. And the practical consequence of subordination to Soviet-dominated agencies was fragmentation of national control over national armed forces of the loyal Pact members. This in turn pre-empted the possibility of organized resistance to Soviet interventions by national armies. This deliberate vulnerability to Soviet intervention was welcomed by the loyal political and military elites of the Warsaw Pact.

A seventh effect of Soviet extended deterrence was to camouflage the very large forces necessary for massive, rapid and unopposed military interventions in Eastern Europe. The doctrinal camouflage was the pose that such forces were critical to victory in a war with NATO, whether nuclear or conventional. Very large combat-ready intervention forces, as demonstrated in 1968, effectively pre-empted organized military resistance by seizing key installations.¹¹⁴ But this could not be publicly acknowledged without destroying the political basis for the Soviet offensive posture.

An eighth effect was to challenge the *de facto* US/NATO superiority in nuclear weapons at tactical, theater and strategic levels at the beginning of the 1960s. By erasing the line between deterrence and pre-emption, a Soviet offensive strategy conferred parity (at least rhetorically) on the smaller Soviet intercontinental arsenal until true parity emerged in intercontinental nuclear weapons. And after nuclear parity at the intercontinental level, Soviet superiority in conventional forces in Europe could call into question the mutually deterrent effects of a Soviet-US nuclear standoff and revalidate the Soviet offensive posture.¹¹⁵ Thus Soviet doctrine made nuclear weapons useable by claiming, contrary to the knowledge of the highest Soviet military leadership,¹¹⁶ that nuclear weapons could be used rationally for military objectives.¹¹⁷ And this claim may have been valid, if in fact the true rationale for the nuclear posture was to maintain the *maskirovka* necessary to protect the greater socialist fatherland.

A ninth effect was to permit Soviet leaders the option of 'extended deterrence' to Soviet clients beyond Europe. The first such experiment was Khrushchev's attempt to extend nuclear deterrence to Cuba. Sergei Khrushchev writes that his father genuinely believed that one of his greatest achievements was going to be that providing external military security for the Cuban revolution.¹¹⁸ As Sergei pointed out, Khrushchev in fact succeeded, obtaining a US commitment not to invade Cuba, albeit at risk of the nuclear devastation of the Soviet Union.¹¹⁹ But neither during nor after the Cuban crisis did American officials (and most American academics) ever accept as genuine Nikita Khrushchev's professed concern with providing a security guarantee to Fidel Castro.

The tenth consequence, enduring until 1987–88, was to enable the Soviets to avoid engaging the West on the question of how to prevent a war. The Soviet doctrine of extended deterrence also allowed Moscow to put an end to the debate with the Chinese Communists over whether war with the imperialists was inevitable. The Soviet Union stood resolutely for peace but would deliver a crushing rebuff if the imperialists unleashed war.

Soviet doctrine diverted Western attention from the question of why a NATO–Warsaw Pact war would be fought to the question of how such a conflict would be fought. What Gorbachev demonstrated after 1987–88 was that the previous Soviet critique of Western deterrence was based on a Warsaw Pact rejection of a war-prevention posture. The political purpose of Soviet doctrine was to insist on the imminent military-technical possibility of nuclear and conventional war.¹²⁰ Out of concern over the ever-increasing military capabilities of the USSR, NATO accepted the terms set in 1961–62 by the Soviet offensive nuclear strategy. The strategic debate in the West was mainly over how to manage confrontation and military conflict rather than how to resolve political conflict.¹²¹

The Sokolovskii volumes on *Military Strategy* took oblique notice of how nuclear weapons created a disjunction between the locus of political objectives and the locus of military objectives.¹²² The Sokolovskii volumes noted that in the pre-nuclear era, it was usually not hard to identify during wartime the relationship between military strategy and political objectives. One simply looked at the physical location/or intended theater of a state's armed forces: if Nazi armies were invading Ukraine, it did not take a rocket scientist to determine Nazi political objectives. But in the era of intercontinental missiles with nuclear warheads, the decisive zones of military conflict (the locations of US and Soviet strategic forces) might be far removed from the territories that were politically central to the war. Put another way, the center of gravity of military conflict and doctrinal debate shifted to military technology, pure and simple.¹²³ As technology constantly evolved, the same basic conundrums of deterrence and war fighting

constantly re-emerged from the fog of renewed debates over doctrine.¹²⁴ The original political motivations for the military-technological confrontation were securely cached in the historical institutes of the USSR and their encyclopedias.

Harriet Fast Scott argues that during the 1960s, most Western analysts did not pay serious attention to the Sokolovskii volumes because 'the strategy expressed was not consistent with the capability of the Soviet Armed Forces'.¹²⁵ As Soviet capabilities gradually met the requirements of doctrine and reached rough parity with the American strategic intercontinental nuclear arsenal in the late 1970s, the concept of 'victory' over NATO by an offensive nuclear/conventional strategy seemed no longer a bluff but a credible threat in the European theater. Western analysts in the mid and late 1970s began to take seriously the Soviet doctrinal propositions that their colleagues had earlier dismissed as bravado.¹²⁶ In the late 1970s and early 1980s declaratory American strategy (Countervailing Strategy, Deep Strike, the Air-Land Battle) began to mimic the nuclear war fighting rhetoric of Soviet doctrine.¹²⁷

The credible Soviet theater threat had thus become a strategy for mutual suicide, as the spokesmen of the new Gorbachev regime acknowledged.¹²⁸ During 1986–87, Gorbachev attempted to put an end to the emerging US-USSR competition to develop nuclear war fighting strategies by declaring that 'a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought'.¹²⁹ For all practical purposes, Gorbachev renounced in 1987–88 the concept of defense of the socialist fatherland, over the objections of the Soviet high command. The new declaratory objective of Soviet military doctrine became war prevention, a Soviet mirror image of the NATO doctrine. When the Soviet Union publicized the new 'defensive' military doctrine, as did the Warsaw Pact,¹³⁰ the locus of military action – defense – shifted to the territory of the Warsaw Pact states.¹³¹

To recap on the defense of the socialist fatherland, from 1953 to 1962 the Soviet military found itself gradually drawn into an apocalyptic confrontation with the American military as Soviet security commitments to ruling communist parties fused into the 'defense of the socialist fatherland'. This meant a commitment keep the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) in power by posing the prospect of a war that would devastate both Germanys. It also meant a commitment to keep all ruling communist parties in power in East Europe, not just the SED. The expectation was that over time the local regimes would legitimize themselves and not be so dependent on Soviet security guarantees. The strategy also sought to pre-empt possible defections from the Warsaw Pact. To provide a reliable shield against the internal and external enemies of the greater socialist fatherland, the Soviet General Staff put on a very dangerous and very costly *maskirovka* of

preparing to fight and win a war on NATO territory. To avoid the trap of self-deterrence that bedeviled the practitioners of Flexible Response, Soviet commanders insisted that they could fight and win a nuclear war. This posture afforded the option of extending deterrence to Soviet clients outside Europe. Thus, Soviet military doctrine did in fact fully reflect the Leninist legacy of the defense of the socialist fatherland. But it also held the leaders of the CPSU hostage to their public commitments to regimes which offered the USSR few if any material gains for the staggering costs¹³² incurred in maintaining a full-scale military confrontation with the more efficient market economies of the Western allies.

NOTES

1. N.V. Ogarkov [chair of the Main Editorial Commission] (ed.), *Voennyi entsiklopedicheski slovar* (Moscow: Voenizdat 1983) p.3.
2. Search in OCLC for 'socialist fatherland' (26 Nov. 2002). PAIS International (1972–2002).
3. For a recent examination of the conceptual organization of Soviet military doctrine, see Christoph Bluth, *The Collapse of Soviet Military Power* (Aldershot: Dartmouth 1995) Ch.2, 'Civil-Military Relations and the Making of Soviet Security Policy'.
4. See the 'Doktrina voennaia', in *Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopediia*, Vol. 3 (Moscow: Voenizdat 1977) pp.225–9. On p.225 the *Encyclopedia* declares, 'Military doctrine consists of two closely linked and interdependent components – the political and the military-technical, with the former playing the leading role'.
5. Andrei Kokoshin, *Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917–91* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1998). This is a translation and slight revision of Kokoshin's 1995 book *Armiia i politika* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia 1995).
6. At the time of this writing (Dec. 2002), Kokoshin was both director of the Institute for International Security (Russian Academy of Sciences) and an elected member of the Russian state Duma.
7. Kokoshin (note 5), *Soviet Strategic Thought* and *Armiia i politika*. Both editions have a 50-page chapter entitled 'The Relationship Between Policy and Strategy in Soviet Military Doctrine'. See, in particular, the discussion of this issue on pp.49–51 of the English text.
8. See Richard Pipes, 'Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War', *Commentary* 64/1 (July 1977) pp.21–34. Reprinted in Richard Pipes, *US–Soviet Relations in the Era of Détente* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1981) pp.135–70. [RTF bookmark start: _Hlt27808116] Joseph D. Douglass and Amoretta M. Hoeber [RTF bookmark end: _Hlt27808116], *Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War* (foreword by Eugene V. Rostow) (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press 1979).
9. William Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military* (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1999), offers an extremely well documented presentation of this view. See Ch.1 'The Soviet Philosophy of War', e.g., pp.14–15: 'In sum, a unique philosophy of war took strong roots early in the Soviet regime. Marxism provided its eschatological component, a pseudo-scientific theory of historical development ... Lenin formulated the voluntarist component of theory by underscoring Marxism own assumption that a socialist revolution depended on the proletariat's class-consciousness and understanding of the laws of history. Most important, Lenin devised the theory of a revolutionary party for inducing such class consciousness in the proletariat and leading it to victory by using violence in a purposely fashion ... War, for Lenin, was not just the continuation of politics by other means; it was the essence of political, domestic and international, because it was the product of class struggle. Politics could only be warfare of a greater or lesser intensity of class struggle until the final victory of socialism.'

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See also his remarks at pp.221-2: 'The Soviet military's ethical responsibility was to help achieve the eventual victory of the international socialist revolution ... Securing Soviet society was merely instrumental to the victory of socialism over capitalism, and not until the late 1930s, when Stalin declared that socialism was victorious in the Soviet Union, was the Red Army responsible to the whole of Soviet society ... the Soviet officer corps, especially in its upper echelon, had deeply internalized this ideological basis for Soviet rule and expansion. Success in revolutionary activities, not the bourgeois ethic of security for the society of a bourgeois states, is the Marxist-Leninist ethical standard for both military officers and party members ...'.

For a 'dovish' argument that the pre-Gorbachev military-political component of Soviet doctrine was the victory of socialism over capitalism, see Stephen Shenfield, *The Nuclear Predicament* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs/Routledge & Kegan Paul 1987) pp.22-36.

10. This argument is supported by the testimonials of the highest-level Soviet leadership to the principles of peace, peaceful coexistence, disarmament, etc., over the period from 1953 to 1987-88. An alarmist reading in the early 1960s of these peaceful professions is N.H. Mager and Jacques Katel (compilers and eds), *Conquest Without War: an analytical anthology of the speeches, interviews and remarks of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev with commentary by Lenin, Stalin and others* (NY: Simon & Schuster 1961). The point here is that Khrushchev's pronouncements could be read as advocating a non-military victory of socialism over capitalism. And it was Khrushchev who presided over the initial systematic formulation of Soviet military doctrine in the Sokolovskii volumes of 1962 and 1963- the volumes which spoke of 'victory' in war, should the imperialists unleash it.
11. See *Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army* (Moscow: Progress Publishers 1972). Earlier editions of this text date to the late 1950s and early 1960s; A.S. Milovodov, *The Philosophical Heritage of V.I. Lenin and the Problems of Contemporary War* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, no date (approx. 1975)); S.A. Tiushkevich [Director of the Institute of Military History], *Filosofia i voennaya teoriia* (Moscow: Nauka 1975); S.A. Tiushkevich et al. (eds), *Voina i armia* (Moscow: Voenizdat 1977).
12. Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (NY: St Martin's 1989); Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence: a conceptual analysis* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 1983); Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1989).
13. Despite their profound differences on US policy toward the USSR, two leading 'hawks', William T. Lee and Richard Staar, were in basic agreement with a leading 'dove', Michael McGwire, in regard to the logic of victory. They argue that Soviet theorists believed that once war began - for whatever reason - the Soviet goal in war had to be victory. Thus, these 'hawk' and 'dove' analysts see the possibility of victory as driving the formulation of Soviet military doctrine during the period from 1959 to the mid 1980s. Despite their deep differences over US policy toward the USSR, these 'hawk' and 'dove' analysts also saw (for better or worse) the *de facto* American goal in war not as victory but deterrence. See Richard Staar and William T. Lee, *Soviet Military Policy Since World War II* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press) Ch. 2: 'From World War II to 1960'; Ch. 3: 'Soviet Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy from Khrushchev to the Present' [1986]. Michael McGwire, *Perestroika and Soviet National Security*, Washington, DC: Brookings 1991), Ch. 2, 'Evolving Military Requirements, 1945-86'. Odom (note 9) makes similar arguments at p.67: 'Although nuclear war would be terrible and should be avoided if possible, one could not be sure that the imperialist would not unleash it, and if they did, the growing Soviet nuclear capabilities would insure that the socialist camp would prevail and that imperialism would meet its demise'.
14. The original 1977 article in the eight-volume *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* on defense of the socialist fatherland was two-and-half pages long compared with half a page in the 1983 one-volume *Military Encyclopedic Dictionary*.
15. *Voennyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar'* (note 1) p.272.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.
19. Note that the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* did not have a corresponding entry. The dictionary's entry for this topic was thus an expansion of the public Soviet discussion doctrinal concepts aimed at a professional military audience.
20. *Voennyi entsiklopedicheskii slovar'* (note 1) p.271.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Matthew J. Ouimet, *The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine* (Chapel Hill: Univ. North Carolina Press 2003). This text does not mention the concept of 'defense of the socialist fatherland'. Ouimet does mention the parallel concept of 'defense of the gains of socialism', but does not relate this concept to the formulation of Soviet military doctrine.
24. Vadim Andreevich Medvedev, *Raspad – Kak on nazreval v 'mirovoy sisteme sotsializma'* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 1994). Medvedev writes on p.9, 'In order to prevent the develop of centrifugal tendencies and to preserve the obedience of our friends, it came to the employment of forceful methods under the rubric of collective responsibility for the fate of socialism: the GDR in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968. In all this there appeared that type of relationship which in the West was called 'the Brezhnev doctrine', although such policy had been conducted before Brezhnev.' Note that Medvedev titles his first chapter, 'From the Brezhnev Doctrine – to Equal Rights and Independence'.
25. Medvedev (note 24) p.9.
26. Gribkov (note XX), *Sud'ba* [full cit. needed]. See chapters entitled 'Berlinskie Khrizisy' and 'Uvertiura k berlinskomu khrizu 1961 goda'.
27. Gribkov (note 26) p.103. In one of the two chapters he devoted to the German problem, General Gribkov provided a three-page survey of the 1953 intervention in East Germany. Gribkov argued that the Soviet intervention of 1953 was required because of the interaction of ill-considered policies by the East German leadership and skillful Western exploitation of these egregious mistakes by alleged provocateurs who crossed the border, by Western media and by related actions of Western governments. In his overall discussion of the German problem, he indicated that the threat to Soviet interests in Germany came from a combination of internal adversaries within in the GDR and external supporters organized as the NATO alliance. Gribkov's analysis of Soviet security problems in Germany from 1949 to 1961 could apply just as well to the dismantling of the Berlin Wall in 1989, though he did not make the comparison. Gribkov also wrote a chapter on the 1968 intervention and two chapters on the threatened invasion of Poland in 1980–81.
28. In *Sud'ba*, Gribkov (note 26) devotes chapters to the following crises, each of which raised the possible collapse of the overall Soviet position in eastern Europe: a chapter on the Berlin crises of 1948–49 and of 1953; a chapter on the Hungarian crisis of 1956; a chapter on the Berlin crises of 1958–61; a chapter on the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968; and a chapter on the Polish crisis of 1980–81. Each of the chapters cited contains a mix of serious scholarship, official Soviet documentation, some polemical arguments, and some personal recollections either of the events themselves or of some of the participants.
29. Warsaw Pact officials often used the term 'shield'. Marshal V.G. Kulikov, Commander of the Pact, titled one of his published volumes on the Pact, *Nadezhnyi shchit mira i sotsializma* (Moscow: Voenizdat 1985) ('The Reliable Shield of Peace and Socialism').
30. Thomas Alan Schwartz, *America's Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1991). See Ch.8, 'The Skeleton Key: Military Integration'.
31. Sergei Fedorovich Akhromeev and Georgii Markovich Korienko, *Glazami marshala i diplomata: kriticheskii vzgliad na vneshniuiu politiku CCCP do i posle 1985 goda* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnaia Otnosheniia 1992) pp.67–8.
32. Gribkov (note 26). In a chapter on the Hungarian intervention entitled 'The First Test of the Firmness of the Warsaw Pact', Gribkov reached five conclusions about the Soviet intervention in Hungary.

One was (p.102) '... if our troops had been used somewhat earlier, then it would have

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been possible to carry out the mission with smaller losses'. Another conclusion was (pp.102-3): 'It was important that we succeeded in neutralizing the main forces of the Hungarian Army. If the Hungarian Army had come out of its barracks, this would have had unpredictable consequences for the divisions and units of its army, it would have significantly affected the course of events.'

33. Gribkov (note 26). In a chapter entitled 'The Second Test of the Firmness of the Warsaw Pact', Gribkov wrote on pp.119-20: '... the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union in evaluating the situation which had arisen in Czechoslovakia did not exclude the possibility of active opposition to the entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia itself ... About 23 hours August 20 A.A. Grechko called on the Secure Communications Link to M. Dzur, informed him about the entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia and in a categorical form demanded from him an order to his troops not to present resistance to the invading troops. Martin Dzur demonstrated courage in making the decision to give such an order without receiving the approval of the state leadership. In the course of the entry of troops and the subsequent events the Czechoslovak armed forces as a whole took a neutral position and remained in their barracks.'

Gribkov adds on pp.123-4: 'It was great good luck that in 1968 as head of the armed forces of Czechoslovakia was a wise man, minister of defense Martin Dzur. He gave the order to his troops not to present resistance to the allied troop units which had entered the territory of Czechoslovakia. By his wise actions he prevented a civil war and a possible bloody battle with the allied troops.'

For an argument that it was Grechko's own meticulous planning and prior contact with Dzur that accounted for Dzur's actions (rather than 'great good luck'), see the memoir by the Soviet commander of the chief invasion force of 1968, Alexandr Mihailovich Maiorov, *Vtorzhenie: Chekhslovakia, 1968* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 'Prava Cheloveka' 1998).

34. Gribkov (note 26). In his two chapters on the Polish events of 1980-81, Gribkov stressed the problem of the absence of a credible Polish political leadership. On p.147 he quoted a report he had presented to Defense Minister Ustinov in which Gribkov said, '... not all means for the peaceful development of events have been used. It is necessary for the government again to try to sit at the negotiating table with the leadership of the trade union Solidarity and to decide all questions which have arisen in the interests of the people.' On p.129 he made this point again in his retrospective analysis: '... Secondly - the demands of the working people were just ... thirdly - there had to be a political solution based on agreement among the government, solidarity and the religious leaders. But unfortunately, no one would sit at the negotiating table.'

He also reports on p.147 that he had warned his superiors: 'the Polish armed Forces is battle ready and is in a patriotic frame of mind. It will not fire on its own people. In the event of the entry of allied troops into Poland the leadership of Solidarity can raise up the people and draw the army into a struggle against our troops and the other allied troops. A civil war could begin, if not worse.'

35. Gribkov (note 26) p.119. Gribkov writes of the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia: 'An important factor in the adoption of the decision was confidence in the fact that USA and NATO would not interfere in the course of events and would consider our preparatory measures as having the quality of defensive measures, directed at the preservation of military-political stability in the CSSR and Eastern Europe as a whole. Testifying to this was the letter of President of the USA L. Johnson to L.I. Brezhnev of 18 August, 1968.'
36. Gribkov (note 26). See the chapter entitled 'The Special Position of the Romanian Leadership'.
37. Gribkov (note 26). Gribkov, Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact from 1976 to 1989, writes on p.164: 'In the postwar years and especially in the formation of the two opposing blocs of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in conditions of sharp confrontation between them of bitter ideological conflict the Soviet Union took on itself the function of the use of force for the purpose of getting out of the crisis situation in the socialist camp itself. But forceful methods of resolution for "treatment of a sick society" did not achieve its desired effect. Each forceful intervention on the part of the Soviet Union and of the group of countries of the Warsaw Pact, as in 1968 during the time of the Czechoslovakia events, did not

strengthen the union of socialist countries. Although for a short time a period of clam began, but the wounds remained far from healed until the end.'

38. Shakhnazarov testifies that from the beginning, the Soviet Politburo ruled out Soviet military intervention as an option. See Georgii Shakhnazarov, *Tsena Svobody: Reformatsiia Gorbacheva glazami ego pomoshchnika* (Moscow: Rossika-Zevs 1993) p.115. Writing in the late 1990s, he regards as irrelevant the Western debate over whether the Soviet Politburo did or did not promise intervention in support of martial law. Shakhnazarov explains on p.151 of Georgii Shakhnazarov, *S Vozhdiami i bez nikh* (Moscow: Vagrius 2001): 'But precisely because military resolution was excluded it was considered necessary to persuade the Poles and the whole world that it was not excluded. [Shakhnazarov's emphasis] They [the Soviet generals] demonstrated the threat of force as best they could. Whether Jaruzelski believed the threat or not does have special significance. As the leader of the country he was obligated not to exclude such a possibility. And besides, events could go beyond the control of the Kremlin. A deliberate provocation against Soviet troops deployed on the territory of Poland would require Moscow unwillingly to take countervailing action. [Soviet] intervention would become inevitable and even justified as a condition of a responsive measure to aggressive actions by NATO.' See Shakhnazarov, *Tsena Svobody*, p.115; and Shakhnazarov, *S Vozhdiami*, p.151.

General Gribkov reports that there was a well-prepared plan for a Soviet intervention prepared as a contingency. He had developed the plan with the active assistance of Polish military officers. See Gribkov (note 26) pp.145-7.

39. Gribkov (note 26) cites on pp.99-100 a Decree of 4 Nov. 1945 issued to Soviet troops by I.S. Konev as Commander in Chief of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact and Marshal of the Soviet Union. The Decree read as follows: 'Comrade soldiers and sergeants, officers and generals! At the end of October in fraternal Hungary the forces of reaction and counterrevolution undertook a mutiny with the goal of destroying the people's-democratic order, liquidating the revolutionary gains of the works and establishing in Hungary the old landlord-capitalist order.

The events have shown that the active participation of the former Horthyites in this adventure is leading to the restoration in Hungary of fascism and the establishment of a direct threat to our fatherland and to the whole socialist camp.

You must not forget that in the past war Horthyite Hungary came out against our Fatherland together with Hitlerite Germany.

In accordance with the request of the government of the Hungarian People's Republic on the basis of the Warsaw Treaty concluded among the countries of the socialist camp, our treaty obligations requiring "coordinated measures necessary for the strengthening of their defense capability, in order to protect the peaceful labor of their people to guarantee the inviolability of their borders and territory and to security defense against possible aggression" Soviet troops have begun the fulfillment of their allied obligations.

There is no doubt that the working class and the working peasantry in the Hungarian People's Republic support us in our just struggle. The task of Soviet troops consists in giving fraternal aid to the Hungarian people in the defense of its socialist gains, in the destruction of counterrevolution and the liquidation of the threat of the restoration of fascism.'

40. The classic Soviet text to demonstrate this point is A.A. Sidorenko, *The Offensive* (A Soviet View) (Washington DC: US Air Force/US Government Printing Office c.1970). Soviet original published in 1970. For coverage of the offensive emphasis of the military-technical side of Soviet doctrine from 1960 to 1987-88, see Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *Soviet Military Doctrine: Continuity, Formulation and Dissemination* (Boulder, CO: Westview 1988). For example, their presentation and discussion of a long quotation from Major General S.N. Kozlov, which, on p.51, includes the following of the Scott text: 'Soviet military doctrine has always considered the offensive as the basic method of the full defeat of the enemy and the achieving of victory, and defense was viewed as a forced form of struggle used when the offensive was impossible or inconvenient.'

In *Soviet Strategic Thought*, Kokoshin (note 5) devotes a whole chapter to the question of 'offense and defense in Soviet military strategy'. His conclusions do not differ

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significantly from those of the Scotts.

41. See Sidorenko, *ibid.* Beginning at ch. III, the discussion is on action on the territory of the adversary.
 42. The Soviet *Military Encyclopedic Dictionary* distinguishes among three types of *maskirovka*: tactical, operational, and strategic. According to the *Dictionary*, the Soviet General Staff is responsible for the planning and execution of strategic *maskirovka*. The purpose of strategic *maskirovka* is 'the disorientation of the enemy in regarding to the groupings of forces, their composition and intentions'. See p.430 for the entry on *maskirovka* in Ogarkov (note 1). There is an English-language literature on how the Soviet military went about the business of deception on the strategic, operational and tactical levels. A classic text that covers the multiple strategic deceptions attempted by Khrushchev is Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Univ. of Chicago Press 1966). Another is Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, *Dezinformatsiia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy* (Washington DC: Pergamon-Brassey's 1984). See also the proceedings of a 1985 conference at the US Naval Postgraduate School in Brian D. Dailey and Patrick J. Parker (ed), *Soviet Strategic Deception* (Stanford CA: Hoover Institution Press 1987). In addition: Andrew W. Hull and Peter B. Almquist, *Managing Uncertainty: Soviet Views on Deception, Surprise and Control* (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses 1989). For a study particularly relevant to issues covered by the author of this article, see also Robert K. George, *An Historical Investigation of Soviet Strategic Deception* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College 1987).
 43. Horelick and Rush, *ibid.*, discuss the frequent use of bluff and threat by Nikita Khrushchev.
 44. Soviet leaders before Gorbachev, including most defense ministers (and some military writers), had episodically acknowledged a dynamic of mutual assured destruction in a formula that ran more or less as follows: should the aggressive forces of imperialism succeed in unleashing a nuclear war, this would be an unprecedented catastrophe for mankind. Soviet leaders usually added that it would be suicidal for the West to launch a nuclear war because of the crushing rebuttal to be delivered by the nuclear forces of the USSR. N.V. Ogarkov, *Istoriia uchit budet'nost'*, (Moscow: Voenizdat 1984) p.88: 'The appearance in 1945 and subsequent rapid development of nuclear weapons with incredible destructive capacities threw a new light on the issue of the expediency of war as a means to achieve a political goal. Only if one lost one's common sense entirely could one try to find arguments and set goals that could justify unleashing world war and thus risking the complete annihilation of the human race. Thus it is an indisputable conclusion that it is criminal to consider the mononuclear war as a rational and seemingly "legal" means of continuing policy.
- Such statements were often tied to Soviet posturing on arms control issues, such as Khrushchev's proposal for universal and complete disarmament, a program that Brezhnev wrote into the 1977 Soviet constitution. Over the period from 1959 to 1987 Moscow made a series of arms control proposals which inspired elaborate negotiating rituals, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties of 1972 and 1979, the Mutual And Balance Force Reduction talks that began in 1973, the Biological Weapons Convention of 1975, the military confidence-building measures of the Helsinki Agreements of 1975 and the gambits of Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces. Every arms control agreement reached before Gorbachev codified absolute increases in the capabilities of Soviet (and American) nuclear arsenals. Moscow responded to the reduction of political tensions by *Ostpolitik*, Détente and the Helsinki Process by deploying new European theater nuclear weapons and improved Soviet conventional forces. The Soviets engaged in wholesale violation of Biological Weapons Convention and of the ABM Treaty as well. Until 1987-88 Soviet leaders could not bring themselves to endorse a military doctrine that renounced the goal of victory on foreign soil in the event that the imperialists finally succeeded in unleashing a nuclear world war.
45. The critique of NATO presented by official Warsaw Pact statements remained virtually unchanged over 40 years until the Gorbachev era. See the collection of documents, V.F. Mal'tsev et al. (eds), *Organizatsiia Varshavskogo dogovora, 1955-1985: dokumenty i*

materialy (Moscow: Politizdat 1986). Note that even the new statements on military doctrine of 1987 continued to insist on the threat of German revanchism. The 1987 communiqué of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee (not the co-published statement on doctrine), declared, 'The activity of revanchist forces, first of all in the Federal Republic of Germany, and the encouragement of revanchism anywhere, run counter to the interests of détente and security, the letter and the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act. In the future, too, such activity will be resolutely rebuffed.' Quotation from 'Communiqué of the Conference of the Warsaw Pact States', Political Consultative Committee', *Pravda* (30 May 1987) p.2, in FBIS SOV-87 (1 June 1987) p.BB-16. Even the book on the new doctrine by the Warsaw Pact commander, P.G. Lushev followed the discussion of the new doctrine of preventing war with a scathing chapter on NATO's new plans for unleashing a war. See P.G. Lushev and V.N. Lobov (eds), *Varshavskii dogovor: istoriia i sovremennost'* (Moscow: Voenizdat 1990) Ch.5.

46. See Kokoshin (note 5) p.4: 'Regrettably, Soviet military thinking was too slow in recognizing the implications of nuclear weapons and the vast stockpiles that adversarial countries possessed. In the Soviet Union in the post-war period, and in the Russian Federation in the 1990s, the theory of nuclear deterrence was and remains insufficiently developed and poorly understood by the political elite and military command. This has eroded the political efficacy of nuclear weapons in Moscow's quest to further its national security objectives, and visibly devalues the huge infusions of resources made by several generations of our people to build the nuclear arsenal. See also his comments in Ch.4, 'In Lieu of a Conclusion'.
47. See David Holloway for an argument that Soviet nuclear weapons scientists understood the catastrophic consequences of nuclear use at any level of conflict. From time to time, some courageous physicists, most notably Andrei Sakharov, would unsuccessfully attempt to intrude upon the formulation of Soviet doctrine in regard to the use of these weapons. David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb* (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1994) Ch.16, 'The Atom and Peace'.
48. John G. Hines, Ellis M. Mishulovich and John Shull, *Soviet Intentions, 1965, Vol. II Soviet Post Cold War Testimonial Evidence* (McLean, VA: BDM Federal In. 22 Sept. 1995) pp.137-8.
49. Ibid. p.140.
50. Kokoshin (note 5) p.121. This observation comes toward the end of Ch.2, entitled, 'Threats to Soviet Security and the Probability of a Future War'.
51. See the sources cited in note 44.
52. Kokoshin (note 5) p.121.
53. G.V. Sredin (ed.), *Internatsional'nyi kharakter zashchity sotsialisticheskogo otechestva* (Moscow: Voenizdat 1988). See also ch. 5, 'Bor'ba s kontrrevoliutsiei- neobkhodimoe uslovie uprocheniia sotsialisticheskikh zavoevanii, zashchita real'nogo sotsializma', in M.P. Mchredlov (ed.), *Marksizm-leninizm o dialektike revoliutsii i kontrreevoliutsii* (Moscow: Politizdat 1984).
54. Shenfield (note 9) passim. See also Odom (note 9) p.97.
55. Akhromeev and Korienko (note 31) pp.68-9.
56. In confirmation of this argument, see James A. Baker III, 'Europe: True Security Requires Shared Freedoms, *Arms Control Update* 12 (US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, March 1989) p.1. Baker declared at the opening negotiations for conventional arms control in Europe: 'Those in the West should be free of the fear that the massive forces under Soviet command might invade them. Those in the East should be free of the fear that armed Soviet intervention, justified by the Brezhnev doctrine, would again be used to deny them choice. 'New Thinking' and the Brezhnev Doctrine are in fundamental conflict. We call upon General Secretary Gorbachev to renounce the Brezhnev Doctrine beyond any shadow of a doubt.'
57. Akhromeev and Korienko (note 31). On pp.69-70, Akhromeev writes of the events of 1989-90: 'There was the collapse of the postwar system of security for the Soviet Union, for which the Soviet people sacrificed so many efforts and which until 1985 was the basis of our foreign policy in Europe. But the situation turned out to be not so simple in that were

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for us not only negative consequences. The new foreign policy for 1986–1989 led at the same time to a significant improvement of relations with the USA and the countries of Western Europe, to a reduction of military tension, to a reduction of the military danger for the Soviet Union – and this was achieved not by military means but by political means. For the Soviet leadership this was out of the ordinary and new. A paradoxical situation arose: we had lost the military – political positions achieved in war in Europe, but we acquired new political positions and the trust of the peoples of Europe. It was difficult for a soldier to immediately understand this contradictory essence of the situation in the analysis of the events of that time. In any case, all [Soviet observers] did not succeed in understanding this in a short period.'

58. See the entry on 'The Socialist Fatherland in Danger!', in *Voennyi entsiklopedicheski slovar'* (note 1) p.692.
59. From the entry for 'Soviet Military Strategy', in N.V. Ogarkov (ed.), *Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopediia*, Vol. 7 (Moscow: Voenizdat 1979) p.563.
60. Harriet Fast Scott dates the initial formulation of post-Stalin Soviet military doctrine to the publication in 1960 of the 'Special Collection' of articles on military doctrine (for the General Staff Academy) in the classified journal of the Soviet General Staff, *Voennaia Mysl'*. See Harriet Fast Scott (ed.), *Soviet Military Strategy* (Soviet edn edited by V.D. Sokolovskii) (NY: Crane & Rusak 1986) 'Editor's Introduction', p.xxi.
61. 'Vneocherednoi XXI S'ezd KPSS ...', in N.I. Savinkin and K.M. Bogoliubov (eds), *KPSS o Voorushennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soiuza* (Moscow: Voenizdat 1981) p.362.
62. Kokoshin (note 5) p.5.
63. See Ch.3, 'Hungary and Albania: Invasion versus Exclusion', esp. pp.48–55, in Robin A. Remington, *The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1971).
64. See Remington, *ibid.*, Ch.4, 'Romania: A Case for Containment'. See also Col. Iulian Cernat *et al.* (eds), *National Defense: The Romanian View* (Bucharest: Military Publishing House 1976).
65. Col. Milan Matous, 'The So-Called "Gottwald Memorandum" – What It was and the Purpose It Served', *Zivot Strany* 42 (15 Oct. 1969), in *Radio Free Europe, Czechoslovak Press Survey* 2272 (18 Nov. 1969), New York: Radio Free Europe Research.
66. Andrei Grechko, 'The Triumph of Leninist Ideas in the Construction of the Soviet Armed Forces', in A.A. Grechko (ed.), *Nuclear Age and War* [English translation] (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Foreign Technology Division 1965) p.11. Note that in the preceding pages Grechko identifies three stages in the development of post-World War II Soviet military doctrine: the period from 1954 to 1953 under Stalin; the period from 1953 to 1969 when nuclear weapons were integrated into the Soviet armed forces; and the period after 1960, when nuclear weapons were integrated into the Soviet alliance system. Grechko does not quite say this directly, but the following discussions make it clear that the dividing line between 1959 and 1960 is a line between introduction of nuclear weapons into Soviet forces and the pose of introduction of nuclear weapons into all Warsaw Pact forces. Often, Western observers were sometimes perplexed at why Soviet officers saw two stages in the development of Soviet doctrine after 1953. For the Western observers the critical issue was the introduction of nuclear weapons: hence their conclusion that this was really a one-stage process. To say this another way: the introduction of nuclear weapons into Soviet doctrine for Soviet forces was no *maskirovka*. Soviet forces did acquire nuclear weapons. But the introduction of nuclear weapons into a Warsaw Pact forces and doctrine was a *maskirovka*. East European forces drilled for nuclear war. They acquired launchers for nuclear systems. But they did not actually possess nuclear weapons, – these remained under Soviet control. Nor did the East Europeans have a plan for nuclear use that would make such use rational in military terms.
67. Grechko, *ibid.* p.7. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott identify this concept of power projection with Grechko, but they date it to an article he published in 1974. See Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *Soviet Military Doctrine: Continuity, Formulation and Dissemination* (Boulder, CO: Westview 1988) p.71.
68. Grechko (note 66) p.11.

69. 'Disarmament is the path toward strengthening peace and ensuring friendship among peoples – N.S. Khrushchev's Report at the USSR Supreme Soviet Session', *Pravda* (15 Jan. 1960), in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* XII/2 (10 Feb. 1960) pp.3–23.
70. Grechko (note 66) p.11.
71. Defense Minister Rodion Malinovskii in his 1962 book identified the 1961 party program as the point of the new Soviet military doctrine. Rodion Ia. Malinovskii, *Bdite! 'no stoiat na strazhe mira* (Moscow: Voenizdat 1962) p.5: 'The New Program of the Party has provided the answer to the fundamental questions of ensuring the security of the construction of communism against the aggressive actions of the imperialists states and their military-political blocs. It has defined in exhaustive detail the tasks of our country.' Quoted in Kokoshin (note 5) p.49.
72. Scott and Scott (note 67) pp.32–46.
73. See 'XXII S'ezd KPSS ...', in Savinkin and Bogoliubov (note 61), for the following interchangeable references: p.371 defense of the Socialist fatherland ('sotsialisticheskoe otechestvo ...'); p.372: defense of the socialist native land ('sotsialisticheskaia otchizna'); p.373: 'defense of the socialist Motherland ('sotsialisticheskaia Rodina').
74. Ibid. pp.371–2.
75. Ibid. p.372.
76. This article accepts the conclusions of the following authors that the main ideas of Soviet military doctrine until 1987 did not deviate much from the Sokolovskii compendia, even allowing for technological innovations, plus more extensive discussion of conventional warfare during the 1970s. See Kokoshin (note 5) p.55: 'In the second half of the 1960s and throughout the 1970s, Soviet military thought and particularly the conception of relations between policy and strategy, scarcely changed'. This view of Soviet policy is also shared by Richard F. Staar and William T. Lee, *Soviet Military Policy Since World War II* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press 1986) chs 1, 2. Scott and Scott (note 67) pp.97–124: chs 1–4; Odom (note 9) chs 1, 5.
77. Kokoshin (note 5) p.50.
78. For a survey of these texts, see Scott and Scott (note 67).
79. None of the Sokolovskii volumes on strategy specifically mentioned 'the socialist fatherland'. They occasionally mentioned 'the gains of socialism'. Instead, the Sokolovskii texts referred to the master category of 'Marxist-Leninist teaching on war'. As Scott and Scott point out in their dissection of the Sokolovskii volumes, the Sokolovskii texts did not discuss 'doctrine' as a whole but only 'strategy', a sub-component of 'military art', which itself was a sub-component of 'the military-technical component of Soviet military doctrine. See ch. 2 of Scott and Scott (note 67). Part of the Soviet system for controlling the flow of information inside and outside was to divide published information into 'themes'. Very few Soviet scholars were allowed to break out of the barriers set by their assigned 'themes' and thus could not create analytical products that could provide a comprehensive view of broad topics. In the case of the Sokolovskii texts, the authors discussed 'strategy'. They did not discuss over-all doctrine, except to note that strategy was a sub-component of doctrine and was subordinate to the political component of doctrine, which they did not discuss in detail. A companion piece to the Sokolovskii volumes of 1962, 1963 and 1968 was Bochkarev's 1965 text, *The Program of the CPSU on Defense of the Socialist Fatherland*, which took only brief note of the contents of Soviet military strategy and devoted its attention instead to the military-political content of doctrine. This volume based on a serious scholarly discussion of Marxist classics as they related to the world military-strategic situation of the 1950s and 1960s. At one point the two texts – Sokolovskii and Bochkarev – converged on a common theme that linked them both: the insistence that the primary military problem was the conduct of coalition wars – the imperialist coalition versus the socialist coalition. Bochkarev provided an extensive historical-philosophical background to this question. And Sokolovskii provided an extensive technical program for how such a conflict might be waged.
80. This theme runs throughout the Sokolovskii text. See V.D. Sokolovskii (ed.), *Soviet Military Strategy*, edited, with analysis and commentary by Harriet Fast Scott (NY: Crane & Rusak 1986). This volume contains the original texts from 1962, 1963 and 1968 editions.

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For an explicit statement see p.210: 'A new world war will be a *coalition* war. (emphasis in original). The military coalition of the capitalist countries will be on one side, while the coalition of the socialist countries will be on the other side.' This conclusion is preceded by the discussion of the two coalitions on pp.179-89.

81. Frank Gibney (ed.), *The Penkovsky Papers* (NY: Doubleday 1965) p.245.
82. Gribkov (note 26) p.36. Gribkov writes that officially the Warsaw Pact had a Main Command of the United Armed Forces [UAF]. 'But until 1960 for all practical purposes no such staff existed'. 'The commander [of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact - UAF] and the chief of staff [UAF] were at the same time first deputies of the minister of defense and of the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army, under whom functioned the tenth Main Administration of the [Soviet] General Staff, which in fact made up the basis of the Staff of the UAF.'

Gribkov notes on p.37: 'In 1969 the PCC adopted a new statute on the United Armed Forces and the United Command in peace time. This statute regulated in more detail the activity of the military organs of the administration of the United Armed Forces. A staff was established as well as other organs of administration, with a small communications post which had limited capabilities.' But he adds on p.38: 'In regard to the questions of the planning of the war time use of the troops assigned to the United Armed Forces, the Soviet General Staff dealt directly the general staffs of the allied armed forces with the participation of the Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff of the UAF.'

Gribkov became Chief of the UAF Staff in 1976. One of the first things he discovered was that the UAF had no administrative structures for a wartime situation. He writes on p.31: 'The documents which would govern who and how to command in war time the United armed forces did not exist ... When I informed D.F. Ustinov that if all the armed forces, from the private to the defense minister knew that the Commander in Chief and the Staff of the UAF did not have specific responsibilities and how the administration of the UAF would be conducted, that no one was worried about how the administration of the UAF would be conducted, he looked at me with astonishment and said that it was necessary to proceed to a practical resolution of this question ...'

'The Staff of the UAF jointly with the general staffs of the Warsaw Pact worked out with great effort a Statute (polozhenie) on the United Armed Forces and their organs of administration in War Time. This document was presented for the review and approval by the CC. The session took place in Moscow in March of 1980.'

83. Jeffrey Simon, *Warsaw Pact Forces: Problems of Command and Control* (Boulder, CO: Westview 1985) pp.18-21, 219.
84. See 'Warsaw Pact Military Planning in Central Europe: Revelations From the East German Archives', *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 2 (Fall 1992); Beatrice Heuser, 'Warsaw Pact Military Doctrines in the 1970s and 1980s: Findings in the East German Archives', *Comparative Strategy* 12 (YEAR) pp.437-57; Julian Isherwood, 'Warsaw Pact Planned to Nuke Its Way Across Europe', *Armed Forces Journal International* (June 1993) p.15.
85. Michael Boll, 'By Blood, Not Ballots: German Unification, Communist Style', *Parameters* (Spring 1994) pp.66-77.
86. See <www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/collection_9/>, Warsaw Pact Generals in Polish Uniforms: Oral Interviews Parallel History Project. See Vojtech Mastny, 'Warsaw Pact Generals in Polish Uniforms', an introductory article on the interviews of Polish generals conducted by the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The principal topic of the PHP discussion was the 'Polish Front' within the Warsaw Pact and its relationship to a host of other issues internal and external to Poland. The essence of the Polish Front was a plan for occupying Denmark and, in another variant, Belgium. The interviews suggest that the idea of occupying Denmark went back to the Stalin period, even before the formation of the Warsaw Pact and before the emergence of a 'nuclear doctrine' for Soviet and East European forces. But it is clear that the 'nuclear variant' of the Polish front emerged in the early 1960s when Andrei Grechko was commander of the Pact. That is, the Polish Army did not plan for nuclear war until after 1960.
87. See <www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/introvrm.htm>, 'Taking Lyon on the Ninth Day?'

The 1964 Warsaw Pact Plan for a Nuclear War in Europe and Related Documents, including Vojtech Mastny, 'Introduction: Planning for the Unplannable'.

88. Grechko (note 66) pp.18–19.
89. These include; V.I. Nechipurenko, *V.I. Lenin o zashchite sotsialisticheskogo otechestva*, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1973; KPSS – organizator zashchity sotsialisticheskogo otechestva (Moscow: Voenizdat 1974); I.I. Mintz (ed.), *Zashchita zavoenvanii sotsialisticheskikh revoliutsii* (Moscow: Nauka 1986); G.V. Sredin (ed.), *Internatsional'nyi kharakter zashchity sotsialisticheskogo otechestva* (Moscow: Voenizdat 1988).
90. See Ch.7, 'The Political Directorate of the Warsaw Pact', in Christopher D. Jones, *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact* (NY: Praeger 1981).
91. K. Bochkarev et al. (eds), *Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for the Protection of the Socialist Fatherland* (2nd edn, revised and enlarged of Russian-language original published by Moscow: Voenizdat 1965). English language bibliographic information (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Foreign Technology Division 1967), quotation from p.77.
92. A. Grechko, 'Torzhestvo leninskikh idei o zashchite sotsialisticheskogo otechestva', *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil* 20 (Oct. 1976).
93. Voenna-nauchnaia biblioteka general'nogo shtaba VS SSSR, Bibliograficheskii ukazatel' statei' pomeshchennykh v zhurnale 'Voennaia Mysl' 1972–1980, Moscow Voenna-nauchnaia biblioteka general'nogo shtaba VS SSSR, 1983. For the years 1972–80 there were 25 entries under the category of 'The Leninist Teaching on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland'. There were also 25 entries for the closely related category of 'The Marxist-Leninist Teaching on War and the Armed Forces'. There were 15 for 'Ideological Struggle in the Area of the Theory and Practice of Military Affairs'. There were only three entries for 'Soviet Military Doctrine'. But over two hundred entries in the two categories of 'Soviet Military Science' and 'Soviet Military Art'. The point here is that the 'Leninist Teaching on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland' and its two related categories constituted the essence of the military-political component of Soviet doctrine. And that 'military science' and 'military art' constituted the military-technical component of doctrine – that is, the practical applications demanded by the military-political component.
94. The concept of defense of the socialist fatherland implicitly took note of the fact that the wars of the Red Army and most of the wars of the fraternal armies were wars not only against external enemies who had invaded these states but also wars against internal opponents. This was true of the multiple theaters of the Great October Revolution of 1917–22 that involved 'Red' and 'White' armies of different national groups. Some of 'white' armies succeeded in establishing independent states outside the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland). The USSR itself was not formally constituted until 1922, after the final liquidation of the anti-communist pretenders to national leadership of Ukraine and other union republics.

There was a dimension of internal war even in the USSR during the Great Fatherland War: the Nazis organized the 'Vlasov Army', led by a former Soviet general; a powerful Ukrainian resistance movement fought not only the Germans but also the Soviets; anti-Soviet armed detachments fought the Red Army in the Caucasus and in the Baltic states. In every liberated country of Eastern Europe, local anti-Nazi military forces also offered at least token resistance to the Soviets and especially to the 'national armies' the Soviets organized for Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania. This fighting went on at a low level for several years after the German surrender. In the Cold War conflicts of the Third World, the belligerents always included local anti-communist military forces, supported by the forces of imperialism and reaction, and forces of national liberation, supported by the fraternal socialist countries.
95. See the article on defense of the socialist fatherland in N.V. Ogarkov (ed.), *Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopedia*, Vol. 3 (Moscow: Voenizdat 1977) pp.427–30.
96. I.I. Mintz (ed.), *Boevoe sodruzhestvo sovetskikh respublik, 1919–1922 gg.* (Moscow: Nauka 1972).

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97. Aleksei Varfolomeevich Antosiak, *Zarozhdenie narodnykh armii stran-uchastnits Varshavskogo dogovora, 1941-49 gg.* (Moscow: Nauka 1975).

98. Sredin (note 89).

99. Marshal Rodion Malinovskii, born in 1898, had fought in World War I, the civil war of 1917-22 and the Spanish civil war of 1936-39. His combat experience during the Great Fatherland War included commands of major fronts inside and outside the USSR. Vasili Sokolovskii was born in 1897. During the civil war of 1917-22 he rose from a company commander to chief of staff of a cavalry division (horse cavalry) to command of Soviet forces stationed in Uzbekistan. In the Great Fatherland war he commanded a front in Europe. He became the first commander (1946-49) of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and faced the first 'Berlin crisis.' He served as Chief of the Soviet General Staff during the crises of 1953 in East Germany and the crises of 1956 in Hungary and Poland. Andrei Grechko, born in 1903, had also fought in the civil war of 1917-22. During the Great Fatherland War he commanded Russian and non-Russian troops in the North Caucasus, then armies in the Ukraine, southern Poland and Czechoslovakia. From 1953 to 1957 he was commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. As Defense Minister in 1968, he superintended the fine details of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia (biographical information from *Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopedia*).

Sokolovskii and Grechko codified their victories as editors of voluminous compilations of doctrine and military history. Marshal Grechko launched the eight-volume project of the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia*, completed in 1980 under Chief of the General Staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov (born 1917). Like his seniors, Ogarkov had fought in the Great Fatherland War. Like Grechko and Sokolovskii, he had served as Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. And in 1983 he chaired the editorial committee of another grand compendium, the *Military Encyclopedic Dictionary*.

100. After the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964, the resolutions of the 22nd Party Congress (1966) declared the mission of the Soviet Armed Forces was 'reliably to defend the gains of socialism' ('XXIII S'ezd KPSS ... Iz rezoliutsii' in Savinkin and Bogoliubov (note 61) p.424). There was no mention of the Socialist Fatherland. But the Congress resolutions and Brezhnev's report to the Congress emphasized that the Soviet Armed Forces carried out their mission of 'defense of the socialist order' in close alliance with the members of the Warsaw Pact, thus affirming the 'international' dimension of 'defending the gains of socialism'.

The 24th Congress (1971) also defined the mission of the Soviet Armed Forces, in conjunction with the armies of the Warsaw Pact states, as that of 'defense of the gains of socialism' ('XXIV S'ezd KPSS ...', in Savinkin and Bogoliubov (note 61) pp.506, 508). The resolutions of the Congress did not mention the Socialist Fatherland.

The same was true of the 25th Congress (1976): endorsement of the military mission of 'defense of the gains of socialism' ('XXV S'ezd KPSS ...' in Savinkin and Bogoliubov (note 61) p.550. At the 26th Party Congress (1981) Leonid Ilich Brezhnev reported on the activities of the Warsaw Pact and declared: 'The Central Committee makes the following report to the Congress: the military-political defensive alliance of the countries of socialism truly serves peace. It possesses everything necessary to reliably defend the socialist gains of our peoples. And we will do everything so that it will be this way in the future as well!' From 'XXVI S'ezd KPSS....', in Savinkin and Bogoliubov (note 61) p.600.

Marshal Viktor Kulikov, commander of the Warsaw Pact, published a 100-page commentary on the last 'Brezhnev Congress', the 26th Congress (1981) entitled *The Collective Defense of Socialism* (part of a series entitled 'Putting the Decisions of the 26th Congress of the CPSU Into Action'). Chapter 2 of the Kulikov book, entitled 'The International Character of the Defense of the Gains of Socialism', began with the forthright declaration on the 'necessity of the ... the defense of the gains of socialism from internal and external enemies.' The Warsaw Pact, he demonstrated, had the mission of providing a collective response on its internal and external fronts. See V.G. Kulikov, *Kollektivnaia zashchita sotsializma* (Moscow: Voenizdat 1982) p.21.

101. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, *Warsaw Pact Political and Military Integration: a Political Analysis* (?place: Hoover paperback 1990). This study relates integration processes within

- the Warsaw Pact to three parallel processes of integration: (1) in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance; (2) in the 'knowledge bureaucracies' of ministries of culture, academies of science etc; (3) intra-party/inter-party coordination of policy within the larger socialist community. A similar argument is in chs 8 and 9 of Helene Carrere D'Encausse, *Big Brother: The Soviet Union and Soviet Europe* (NY: Holmes & Meier) 1987.
102. *The Constitutions of the USSR and the union republics: analysis, texts, reports*, edited by F.J.M. Feldbrugge: Sijthoff and Noordhoff/Documentation Office for East European Law, University of Leyden 1979. See p.225 for original Russian text of Chapter Five. Article 31 (part of Chapter Five) reads, 'Defense of the socialist Fatherland is one of the most important functions of the states and is a concern of the whole people. In order to defend the socialist gains and peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, the Armed Forces of the USSR have been created and university military service has been established. The duty of the Armed Forces of the USSR to the people is reliably to defend the socialist Fatherland and to remain in constant combat readiness, guaranteeing an instant rebuff to any aggressor.' See the following article by A.A. Epishev in *Voennaia Mysl'*, noting the constitutional-legal significance of this provision for Soviet soldiers: 'The Mobilizing force of the article of the constitution of the USSR on defense of the socialist fatherland, *Voennaia Mysl'* (1978) pp.14-25.
 103. *Constitutions of the USSR*, ibid. p.225.
 104. Ibid. See p.280 for the equivalent articles adopted by the separate union republics of the USSR.
 105. See Gribkov (note 26) pp.74-81, for chapter entitled, 'The special position of the Romanian leadership'.
 106. The article on the 'defense of the socialist fatherland' (*zashchita sotsialisticheskogo otechestva*) in *Sovetskaiia voennaia entsiklopediia*, Vol. 3 (Moscow: Voenizdat 1977) claims at p.430 that the party and state documents of socialist states other than the USSR also endorse the concept of 'defense of the socialist fatherland'. This claim is repeated in other authoritative Soviet texts, of the Brezhnev era, for instance, A.A. Epishev [Chief of the Soviet Main Political Administration], *Partiia i armia* (Moscow: Politizdat 1977) p.321; I.I. Iakubovskii [Commander of the Warsaw Pact], *Boevoe sodruzhestvo bratskikh narodov i armii* (Moscow: Voenizdat 1975) p.10; V.G. Kulikov [Commander of the Warsaw Pact], *Varshavskii dogovor: soiuz vo imia mira i sotsializma* (Moscow: Voenizdat 1980) pp.11-22. For the East European party programs of the Brezhnev era that endorsed the concept of the defense of the gains of socialism and occasionally also the concept of defense of the socialist fatherland, see the following: For Bulgaria: *X S'ezda Bolgarskoi kommunisticheskoi parti* (Moscow: Politizdat 1972) p.288. For Hungary, see *XI S'ezd Vengerskoi sotsialisticheskoi rabochei partii* (Moscow: Politizdat 1975) pp.252, 254, 255. For the GDR, see *Dokumente des VII Parteitag der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag 1971) p.13. For Poland, see *VII S'ezd Pol'skoi ob'edinnenoi rabochei partii* (Moscow: Politizdat 1977) pp.235-7. For Czechoslovakia, see *XIV S'ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Chekhoslovakii* (Moscow: Politizdat 1971) p.259. The Romanians emphatically refused to endorse the concept of joint defense of the gains of socialism or the joint defense of the socialist fatherland.
 107. Harold J. Berman and John B. Quigley, *Basic Laws on the Structure of the Soviet State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1969) pp.25-6.
 108. Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1976) chs 1-4 (original publication 1966). See chs 1-4.
 109. This may explain the claim of Kokoshin (and Odom) that high level Soviet military officials sometimes explained their emphasis on victory in nuclear war as a necessary morale-building gesture for Soviet troops. See Kokoshin (note 5) p.140: 'It is worth mentioning that in the past, statements by the Soviet military about victory being the ultimate goal of war were ritualized, and targeted first of all at raising the morale of troops'.
 110. For an authoritative Soviet statement that the objective of the doctrinal changes of 1987-88 was war prevention, see P.G. Lushev (Commander of the Warsaw Pact) and V.N. Lobov (Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact) (eds), *Varshavskii dogovor: istoriia i sovremennost'* (Moscow: Voenizdat 1990) Ch. 4.

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See also Akhromeev and Korienco (note 31) p.126. Akhromeev makes the following observations about the 1986 presentation he made of Gorbachev's new military doctrine to the faculty and staff of the General Staff Academy, at p.126: 'And in conclusion I said that now our military doctrine has taken on a new quality. The activity of the political and military leadership for the prevention of war has been included as a basic part of doctrine.'

The prevention of war has become both a theoretical part of military doctrine and a practical part of the activity of the military leadership of the Soviet Union. Now the military doctrine of the USSR constitutes a system of fundamental views officially adopted by the Soviet state on the prevention of war, on the organization of armed forces, on the preparation of the country and the armed forces for the repulsion of aggression, and also on the means of conducting armed struggle for the defense of the socialist fatherland.

Thus, new content was introduced in the majority of its basic propositions by comparison with those in the past.'

111. John G. Hines and Donald Mahoney, *Defense and Counteroffensive Under the New Soviet Military Doctrine* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1991).
112. Akhromeev and Korienco (note 31) p.126.
113. Cernat *et al.* (note 64) *passim*.
114. General Makhmut Gareev compared Grechko's handling of the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia to Ustinov's bungled intervention in Afghanistan. See Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev, *Afghanskaia strada (s sovetskimi voiskami i bez nikh)* (Moscow: INSAN 1999) pp.43-4: 'Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko at a meeting of commanders in Legnica in the beginning of August 1968 said that they [the leaders of the Soviet Politburo] had proposed to him a 'limited contingent' of no more than 4-5 divisions. But A.A. Grechko was a man of strong will, and decisive. According to his words he insisted on sending in no less than 20-25 divisions... We clearly saw how the sudden invasion by massive forces permitted from the very beginning the full blockading of major cities, road communications, military garrisons, and military depots. Therefore, even if there had been some military units that tried to master resistance, they would not have been able to do it.
(The truth was the many Czechoslovak military personnel remained loyal or neutral in their attitude to the entry of the troops of the Warsaw Pact into their country) [Gareev's parentheses] We will not now speak about the political motives of armed intervention of the USSR and of the other countries of the WTO in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia... But to take purely military point of view, then it goes without saying that these actions were well thought out, decisive, purposeful and, in the final analysis, effective. The main thing is that these actions permitted the rapid stabilization of the situation and for all practical purpose prevented bloodshed.'
115. Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 1983).
116. Hines *et al.* (note 48) pp.137-8.
117. Soviet leaders before Gorbachev, including most defense ministers (and many military writers), had episodically acknowledged a dynamic of mutual assured destruction in a formula that ran more or less as follows: should the aggressive forces of imperialism succeed in unleashing a nuclear war, this would be an unprecedented catastrophe for mankind. Soviet leaders usually added that it would be suicidal for the West to launch a nuclear war because of the crushing rebuff to be delivered by the nuclear forces of the USSR. For instance, Ogarkov (note 44) p.88: 'The appearance in 1945 and subsequent rapid development of nuclear weapons with incredible destructive capacities threw a new light on the issue of the expediency of war as a means to achieve a political goal. Only if one lost one's common sense entirely could one try to find arguments and set goals that could justify unleashing world war and thus risking the complete annihilation of the human race. Thus it is an indisputable conclusion that it is criminal to consider thermonuclear war as a rational and seemingly "legal" means of continuing policy.' But in later passages of this book Ogarkov reaffirms the Soviet determination to give a crushing rebuff to aggression launched by the imperialists.
118. Sergei N. Khrushchev, *Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP 2000) p.437.

119. Ibid. See Ch.6 'Crisis'.
120. Western 'hawks' focused their attention on the question of how the Soviets planned to fight. Western 'doves' responded with their own fixation: how arms control and confidence-building measures could achieve stable deterrence. The hawks accused the doves of being the captives of MAD logic (Mutual Assured Destruction). The doves accused the hawks of being the captives of NUTS logic (Nuclear Utilization Theories). The Soviet contribution to the debate between Western hawks and doves was to insist that that peace could be best assured by a Soviet capability to deliver a crushing rebuff to Western aggression. As for a political solution to the Cold War military confrontation, the Soviet contribution was to denounce Western theories of 'convergence'; to denounce the idea that détente implied an end to 'class struggle' and to denounce 'abstract pacifism'.
121. One exception was the Nixon-Kissinger-Ford program of détente; another was the Brandt-Schmidt program of *Ostpolitik*. But both programs were badly wounded in the crossfire between domestic hawks and the Soviet high command.
122. Sokolovskii (note 80) p.210: 'The center of gravity of the entire armed combat under these [nuclear] conditions is transferred from the zone of contact between the adversaries, as was the case in past wars, into the depth of the enemy's location, including the most remote regions. As a result, the war will acquire an unprecedented spatial scope.' On p.201 the text had noted, 'In all previous wars the main military-strategic goals of the belligerent parties were the defeat or weakening of the enemy's armed forces and, as a result of this, the seizure and retention of vitally important regions or administrative-political centers. The achievement of these goals generally assured the realization of the political goals which were set in the war.'
123. Shakhnazarov (note 38) p.86. Shakhnazarov, a key Gorbachev adviser, entitled a chapter of this book, 'The Taming of the Moloch'. In this discussion of what Shakhnazarov called the Soviet military-industrial complex he reported an exchange he once had with Defense Minister Ustinov about the impact technological innovation on military affairs. Ustinov told him, 'You know, earlier, things did not depend so much on weapons alone ... but on the wisdom and knowledge of the soldier. But now, if you please, it is the contrary. It is not a matter of profound thinking – you just press a button.'
124. See 'Conclusion' in Freedman (note 12) in particular p.400: 'At the end of 35 years of attempts at constructing nuclear strategies one is forced to the conclusion that there has been a move to analysis of second and third-order issues. If strategic thought in the future is to consist of no more than permutations of old concepts in response to new military capabilities, or the exigencies of arms control negotiations in a desperate attempt to preserve the *status quo*, then it may have reached a dead end....it is clear that if there were a major break-down in East-West relations in Europe and if fighting began, there would be a great confusion with plans drawn up before a war soon overtaken by events, and nobody able to promise victory. Those who have responsibility for unleashing nuclear arsenals live by the motto that if they ever had to do so they would have failed. Remarkably, up to now [1981], they have succeeded. C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la stratégie.'
125. Harriet Fast Scott, p.xxxix of 'Editor's Introduction' to Scott (note 60). Kokoshin (note 5) concurs. He writes in *Soviet Strategic Thought* on p.22: 'Now [1995], however, both Soviet and foreign experts almost unanimously agree that the Soviet Union in no way enjoyed general superiority over the United States and its allies in the 1960s'.
126. Scott (note 60) p.xxxiv. See also Stephen J. Cimbala, *Rethinking Nuclear Strategy* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources 1988) Ch.7, 'Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War: Are There "Winning" Options?' See also Colin S. Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style* (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press 1986) Ch.3, 'National Style in Strategy II: The Soviet Union'. See also Gray's chapter in Derek Leebeart and Timothy Dickinson (eds), *Soviet Strategy and the New Military Thinking* (NY: CUP 1992).
127. Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1984). This is a discussion of the 'countervailing strategy' that emerged in the late Carter administration into the early Reagan administration.
128. Shenfield (note 9). Shenfield provides a through discussion of the doctrinal-conceptual

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- revisions by Gorbachev and his advisers. For a similar but more concise argument see Odom (note 9) p.97.
129. Kokoshin (note 5) p.140: 'The Soviet leadership's acknowledgement that there could be no victory in a nuclear war was momentous. This occurred only after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985.'
130. See 'On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Member States', *Pravda* (31 May 1987) pp.1-2, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) SOV-87-104, 1 June 1987. See also 'Communiqué of the Warsaw Pact Member States' Political Consultative Committee Conference', *Pravda* (17 July 1988), in FBIS SOV-88-137 (18 July 1998).
131. John G. Hines and Donald Mahoney, *Defense and Counteroffensive Under the New Soviet Military Doctrine* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1991) esp. Chs.2 and 3.
132. Kokoshin (note 5) attributes the ultimate political insolvency of Soviet military doctrine to the policy of defending 'three empires'. He writes on p.5: 'No country could have withstood such an enormous strain on its resources, no matter how strong its apparatus of social control or how great its human and material resources. Those 'three empires' prevented resources in being invested in building up the ancient Russian territories, the core of the Soviet Union. The Russian countryside, which for hundreds of years had produced soldiers who repeatedly impressed the world with their heroic accomplishments when statesmen and military leaders could not cope, was now falling into utter decay.'

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